Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

TAOS and Intersil were both developing ambient light sensors for electronic devices. Ambient light sensors use a silicon- or other semiconductor-based photodiode that absorbs light and conducts a current. The resulting photocurrent is detected by a sensor, and measurements of the current, a function of the ambient light, are used to adjust the brightness of an electronic screen display. One benefit is better visibility; another is improved battery efficiency. In 2004, the parties confidentially shared technical and financial information during negotiations regarding a possible merger that did not occur. Soon after, Intersil released new sensors with the technical design TAOS had disclosed in the confidential negotiations. TAOS sued for infringement of its patent, and for trade secret misappropriation, breach of contract, and tortious interference with prospective business relations under Texas state law. A jury returned a verdict for TAOS and awarded damages on all four claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed liability for trade secret misappropriation, though on a more limited basis than TAOS presented to the jury, and affirmed liability for infringement of the asserted apparatus claims of the patent, but vacated the monetary awards. The court noted that there was no evidence of Intersil’s independent design of the photodiode array structure. View "Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions, Inc. v. Renesas Electronics America, Inc." on Justia Law

Disc’s 113 patent, entitled “Spinal Brace,” is directed to an air injectable band with a rigid panel worn around the waist. When the band is inflated it expands vertically to provide traction to the spine of the user to relieve back pain. Disc's 509 patent is entitled “Wrinkled Band Without Air Expansion Tube and its Manufacturing Method.” VGH manufactures and sells inflatable spinal brace products. Disc sued for infringement, specifically identifying VGH’s products and alleging that the products meet “each and every element of at least one claim of the 113 [or 509] Patent, either literally or equivalently.” Disc attached the asserted patents and photographs of the accused products. The following day, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, abrogating Rule 84 and Form 18, stating that the amendments “shall govern in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.” The district court dismissed Disc’s complaint with prejudice, reasoning that the change applied and that the complaint did not meet the “Iqbal/Twombly” standard articulated by the Supreme Court. The court denied Disc’s motions for reconsideration and to amend the judgment. The Federal Circuit reversed. Disc’s allegations are sufficient under the plausibility standard of Iqbal/Twombly. Disc’s disclosures provided VGH fair notice of infringement of the asserted patents. View "Disc Disease Solutions Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Communique’s patent, entitled “System Computer Product and Method for Providing a Private Communication Portal,” allows a remote computer to access a personal computer via the Internet, using a “location facility” to “creat[e] a communication channel.” In 2006, Communique sued, alleging that Citrix’s GoToMyPC remote computer connection service infringed two claims. The court stayed proceedings pending resolution of inter partes reexamination. In 2013, the Patent Board confirmed the patentability of the claims over prior art references, including Citrix’s BuddyHelp computer connection service. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Returning to the district court, Citrix argued that the claims were patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101, because they “only require[] generic software operating on a generic computer system to implement the abstract idea of connecting two computers.” The court rejected this argument. A jury concluded that Citrix had not established that the claims were invalid, but that Communique had not established that Citrix’s product infringed those claims. The Federal Circuit affirmed; the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that while the reexamination record could be used at trial, the jury could not be informed that Citrix had requested the reexamination. Citrix’s argument did not rest on an improper “practicing the prior art” defense, but instead correctly recognized that claim terms must be “construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement.” View "01 Communique Laboratory, Inc v. Citrix Online, LLC" on Justia Law

Merck's patents claim classes of compounds, identified by structural formulas, and the administration of therapeutically effective amounts of such compounds for treating Hepatitis C. Gilead developed its own Hepatitis C treatments, marketed as Solvadi® and Harvoni®, based on the compound sofosbuvir. Gilead sought a declaratory judgment that Merck’s patents were invalid and that Gilead was not infringing. Merck counterclaimed for infringement. Gilead stipulated to infringement based on the court’s claim construction, which was not appealed. A jury trial was held on Gilead’s challenges to the patents as invalid for lack of both an adequate written description and enablement of the asserted claims, and Gilead’s defense that Merck did not actually invent the subject matter but derived it from another inventor, employed by Gilead’s predecessor. The jury ruled for Merck but the district court ruled for Gilead, finding pre-litigation business misconduct and litigation misconduct attributable to Merck, and barred Merck from asserting the patents against Gilead. The court awarded attorney’s fees, relying on the finding of unclean hands. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment based on unclean hands. The district court found, with adequate evidentiary support, two related forms of pre-litigation business misconduct attributable to Merck. The court noted clear violations of a “firewall” understanding between Gilead’s predecessor and Merck, with a direct connection to the ultimate patent litigation. View "Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Merck's patents claim classes of compounds, identified by structural formulas, and the administration of therapeutically effective amounts of such compounds for treating Hepatitis C. Gilead developed its own Hepatitis C treatments, marketed as Solvadi® and Harvoni®, based on the compound sofosbuvir. Gilead sought a declaratory judgment that Merck’s patents were invalid and that Gilead was not infringing. Merck counterclaimed for infringement. Gilead stipulated to infringement based on the court’s claim construction, which was not appealed. A jury trial was held on Gilead’s challenges to the patents as invalid for lack of both an adequate written description and enablement of the asserted claims, and Gilead’s defense that Merck did not actually invent the subject matter but derived it from another inventor, employed by Gilead’s predecessor. The jury ruled for Merck but the district court ruled for Gilead, finding pre-litigation business misconduct and litigation misconduct attributable to Merck, and barred Merck from asserting the patents against Gilead. The court awarded attorney’s fees, relying on the finding of unclean hands. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment based on unclean hands. The district court found, with adequate evidentiary support, two related forms of pre-litigation business misconduct attributable to Merck. The court noted clear violations of a “firewall” understanding between Gilead’s predecessor and Merck, with a direct connection to the ultimate patent litigation. View "Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

SAS sought inter partes review (35 U.S.C. 311(a)) of ComplementSoft’s software patent, alleging that all 16 of the patent’s claims were unpatentable. The Patent Office instituted review on some of the claims and denied review on the rest. The Federal Circuit rejected SAS’s argument that section 318(a) required the Board to decide the patentability of every claim challenged in the petition. The Supreme Court reversed. When the Patent Office institutes an inter partes review, it must decide the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has challenged. Section 318(a), which states that the Board “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner” is mandatory and comprehensive. The Director’s claimed “partial institution” power (37 CFR 42.108(a)) appears nowhere in the statutory text. The statute envisions an inter partes review guided by the initial petition. While section 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on whether to institute review, it does not invest him with discretion regarding what claims that review will encompass. The Director’s policy argument—that partial institution is efficient because it permits the Board to focus on the most promising challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others—is properly addressed to Congress. View "SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu" on Justia Law

SAS sought inter partes review (35 U.S.C. 311(a)) of ComplementSoft’s software patent, alleging that all 16 of the patent’s claims were unpatentable. The Patent Office instituted review on some of the claims and denied review on the rest. The Federal Circuit rejected SAS’s argument that section 318(a) required the Board to decide the patentability of every claim challenged in the petition. The Supreme Court reversed. When the Patent Office institutes an inter partes review, it must decide the patentability of all of the claims the petitioner has challenged. Section 318(a), which states that the Board “shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner” is mandatory and comprehensive. The Director’s claimed “partial institution” power (37 CFR 42.108(a)) appears nowhere in the statutory text. The statute envisions an inter partes review guided by the initial petition. While section 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on whether to institute review, it does not invest him with discretion regarding what claims that review will encompass. The Director’s policy argument—that partial institution is efficient because it permits the Board to focus on the most promising challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others—is properly addressed to Congress. View "SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu" on Justia Law

Oil States sued Greene's Energy for infringement of a patent relating to technology for protecting wellhead equipment used in hydraulic fracturing. Greene’s challenged the patent’s validity in court and petitioned the Patent Office for inter partes review, 35 U.S.C. 311-319. The district court issued a claim-construction order favoring Oil States; the Board concluded that Oil States’ claims were unpatentable. The Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of inter partes review. The Supreme Court affirmed. Inter partes review does not violate Article III. Congress may assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts. Inter partes review falls within the public-rights doctrine. Patents are “public franchises” and granting patents is a constitutional function that can be carried out by the executive or legislative departments without “judicial determination.’ Inter partes review involves the same basic matter as granting a patent. Patents remain “subject to [the Board’s] authority” to cancel outside of an Article III court. The similarities between the procedures used in inter partes review and judicial procedures does not suggest that inter partes review violates Article III. The Court noted that its decision “should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.” When Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.” View "Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Oil States sued Greene's Energy for infringement of a patent relating to technology for protecting wellhead equipment used in hydraulic fracturing. Greene’s challenged the patent’s validity in court and petitioned the Patent Office for inter partes review, 35 U.S.C. 311-319. The district court issued a claim-construction order favoring Oil States; the Board concluded that Oil States’ claims were unpatentable. The Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of inter partes review. The Supreme Court affirmed. Inter partes review does not violate Article III. Congress may assign adjudication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts. Inter partes review falls within the public-rights doctrine. Patents are “public franchises” and granting patents is a constitutional function that can be carried out by the executive or legislative departments without “judicial determination.’ Inter partes review involves the same basic matter as granting a patent. Patents remain “subject to [the Board’s] authority” to cancel outside of an Article III court. The similarities between the procedures used in inter partes review and judicial procedures does not suggest that inter partes review violates Article III. The Court noted that its decision “should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.” When Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.” View "Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The patent, which lists Rieley and Muller as inventors and for which they applied for in 1997, describes the conversion of an incoming facsimile or voicemail message into a digital representation, which is then forwarded to an email address. The patent was originally assigned to JFAX, which was owned by Rieley and Muller. It is now assigned to AMT; j2 has an exclusive license. The patent expired in 2017. James alleges that in 1995 Rieley asked James to develop software that would provide “Fax-to-Email, Email-to-Fax, and Voicemail-to-Email” functions. In 1996, James and Rieley signed a contract that does not mention patent rights, but expressly requires the assignment to JFAX of “all copyright interests” in the developed “code and compiled software.” The system was complete in 1996. James assigned all copyrights in code and compiled software to JFAX, but “did not assign any patent ownership or inventorship rights.” He claims that he was not aware of the patent until 2013 when he was contacted by attorneys representing a defendant in an infringement suit. James brought a claim for correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. 256, with state-law claims for unjust enrichment, conversion, misappropriation, and unfair competition. Finding James had no Article III standing, the district court dismissed. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the agreement could be read as not assigning patent rights and as not establishing a hired-to-invent relationship. View "James v. J2 Cloud Services, LLC" on Justia Law