Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

Suffolk owns a patent directed to methods and systems for controlling a server that supplies files to computers rendering web pages. The patent discloses using the address of the referring web page to determine whether to serve a file, and if so, which file. The district court entered summary judgment of invalidity, holding that claims 1, 7, and 9 were anticipated by a Usenet newsgroup post. Suffolk then stipulated that, in light of the district court’s prior art, claim construction, and expert testimony rulings, claim 6 was also anticipated. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Suffolk Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc." on Justia Law

The related patents claim priority from a 1998 application and concern drugs for treatment of spinal nerve injuries, often associated with herniated discs. Between spinal vertebrae are soft “spinal discs,” that permit the spine to flex and move by absorbing and distributing compressive forces. A spinal disc becomes herniated when tissue surrounding it tears and nucleus pulposus, normally inside the disc, leaks into the epidural space of the spine. Nucleus pulposus secretes TNF-α, a powerful signaler of inflammation and other injuries. The nerve roots that extend from the spinal cord pass through the epidural space; if they come into contact with TNF-a, back pain or numbness may result. Nerve root injuries may be reduced or eliminated by “inhibiting” the TNF-α. Tobinick brought an interference proceeding. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board dismissed, construing “administered locally” as administering the claimed therapeutic compound “directly to the site where it is intended to act, that is, to the location where the nucleus pulposus is causing the symptoms of the nerve disorder.” The Board found that Tobinick’s patent application did not contain written description support so that he lacked standing to bring the interference. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Tobinick’s application contained sufficient written description support for local administration; it describes administering the therapeutic compound to the epidural space adjacent to a herniated spinal disc, which is the site where it is intended to act and the location where the nucleus pulposus is causing symptoms of the nerve disorder. View "Tobinick v. Olmarker" on Justia Law

In 2001, InTouch developed a remote telepresence robot system for the health care industry that allows physicians and family members to visit a patient through a remote terminal without travelling to the patient’s physical location. The system permits a user to operate a robot from a remote terminal, e.g., computer or tablet. The InTouch robot has a video display, two-way audio, and a camera. Based on the user’s instructions, the robot travels throughout a hospital, and a user appears through live video on the video display as a remote presence. In 2012, InTouch sued, alleging that VGo’s remote telepresence robot system infringed several of its patents. A jury returned a verdict of noninfringement of all three asserted patents, found claim 79 of the 357 patent and claim 1 of the 030 patent invalid based on obviousness. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of non-infringement, but reversed the findings of invalidity regarding the 357 and 030 patents. View "InTouch Tech., Inc. v. VGo Commc'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

Monsanto developed a genetic modification in soybean seeds (Roundup Ready® (RR)), known as the 40-3-2 event (RR trait), which enables soybean plants to tolerate application of glyphosate herbicide to kill weeds. Monsanto owns the patent for the RR trait and granted Pioneer a license to produce and sell seeds containing the traits. After Pioneer became a subsidiary of DuPont, Monsanto and Pioneer entered into an amended license, under which DuPont produced and sold RR trait seed. In 2006, DuPont announced that it had developed a glyphosate-tolerant trait, OGAT, expected to confer tolerance to both glyphosate and acetolactate synthase inhibitor herbicide. Testing indicated that OGAT alone did not provide sufficient glyphosate-tolerance for commercial use. DuPont then combined OGAT with the RR trait; the OGAT/RR stack provided increased yields in field trials. DuPont did not sell any OGAT/RR product, however, and discontinued development. Monsanto sued DuPont for breach of the license and patent infringement. The district court granted partial judgment to Monsanto, holding that the license was unambiguous and did not grant the right to stack non-RR technologies with the licensed” trait, but allowed DuPont to amend its answer to assert reformation counterclaims and defenses. The court ultimately told DuPont to “either voluntarily dismiss these reformation claims or produce … all documents … previously withheld.” DuPont continued litigating its reformation counterclaims and produced previously withheld internal e-mails that showed its awareness that it did not have the right to commercialize the OGAT/RR stack. The court found that DuPont’s position was not rooted in fact, that DuPont made misrepresentations and had perpetrated a fraud on the court, struck DuPont’s reformation defense and counterclaims, and awarded limited attorney fees to Monsanto. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

Sun developed the Java computer programming platform, released in 1996, to eliminate the need for different versions of computer programs for different operating systems or devices. With Java, a programmer could “write once, run anywhere.” The Java virtual machine (JVM) takes source code that has been converted to bytecode and converts it to binary machine code. Oracle wrote 37 packages of computer source code, “application programming interfaces” (API), in the Java language, and licenses them to others for writing “apps” for computers, tablets, smartphones, and other devices. Oracle alleged that Google’s Android mobile operating system infringed Oracle’s patents and copyrights. The jury found no patent infringement, but that Google infringed copyrights in the 37 Java packages and a specific routine, “rangeCheck.” It returned a noninfringement verdict as to eight decompiled security files. The jury deadlocked on Google’s fair use defense. The district court held that the replicated elements of the 37 API packages, including the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization, were not subject to copyright and entered final judgment in favor of Google on copyright infringement claims, except with respect to rangeCheck and the eight decompiled files. The Federal Circuit affirmed as to the eight decompiled files that Google copied into Android and rangeCheck. The court reversed in part, finding that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the API packages are entitled to copyright protection, and remanded for consideration of fair use.View "Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc." on Justia Law

Alice Corporation holds patents that disclose a scheme for mitigating “settlement risk,” i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation. The patent claims are designed to facilitate the exchange of financial obligations between parties, using a computer system as a third-party intermediary. The patents claim: a method for exchanging financial obligations; a computer system configured to carry out that method; and a computer-readable medium containing program code for performing that method. CLS, a global network that facilitates currency transactions, challenged the claims as not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable. Alice counterclaimed infringement. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski, the district court held that the claims were ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. 101. The Federal Circuit and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. Section 101, which defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection, contains an implicit exception for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. In applying the exception, patents that claim the building blocks of human ingenuity, which are ineligible for patent protection, must be distinguished from those that integrate the building blocks into something more, making them patent-eligible. The claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept: the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, which is “‘a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.” The method claims, which simply require generic computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea, adding the words “apply it with a computer,” simply combines two steps, with the same deficient result. Taking the claim elements separately, the functions performed by the computer at each step are purely conventional: creating and maintaining “shadow” accounts, obtaining data, adjusting account balances, and issuing automated instructions. They do not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself or improve any other technology or technical field. The system claims are no different in substance from the method claims, reciting a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. View "Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l" on Justia Law

Akamai is the exclusive licensee of a patent that claims a method of delivering electronic data using a content delivery network (CDN). Limelight also operates a CDN and carries out several of the steps claimed in the patent, but its customers, rather than Limelight itself, perform a step of the patent known as “tagging.” Under Federal Circuit case law, liability for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(a) requires performance of all steps of a method patent to be attributable to a single party. The district court concluded that Limelight could not have directly infringed the patent at issue because performance of the tagging step could not be attributed to it. The en banc Federal Circuit reversed, holding that a defendant who performed some steps of a method patent and encouraged others to perform the rest could be liable for inducement of infringement even if no one was liable for direct infringement. The Supreme Court reversed. A defendant is not liable for inducing infringement under section 271(b) when no one has directly infringed. The Federal Circuit’s contrary view would deprive section 271(b) of ascertainable standards and require the courts to develop parallel bodies of infringement law. Citing section 271(f), the Court stated that Congress knows how to impose inducement liability predicated on noninfringing conduct when it wishes to do so. Though a would-be infringer could evade liability by dividing performance of a method patent’s steps with another whose conduct cannot be attributed to the defendant, a desire to avoid this consequence does not justify fundamentally altering the rules of inducement liability clearly required by the Patent Act’s text and structure. View "Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs, Inc." on Justia Law

A patent specification must “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as [the] invention,” 35 U.S.C. 112. The 753 patent involves a heart-rate monitor used with exercise equipment; it asserts that prior monitors were often inaccurate in measuring the electrical signals accompanying each heartbeat (ECG signals) because of the presence of other electrical signals generated by the user’s skeletal muscles that can impede ECG signal detection. The invention claims to improve on prior art by detecting and processing ECG signals in a way that filters out the interference. Claim 1 refers to a “heart rate monitor for use by a user in association with exercise apparatus and/or exercise procedures.” The claim comprises a cylindrical bar fitted with a display device; electronic circuitry including a difference amplifier; and, on each half of the bar, a “live” electrode and a “common” electrode “mounted ... in spaced relationship with each other.” The exclusive licensee alleged that Nautilus, without obtaining a license, sold exercise machines containing its patented technology. The district court granted Nautilus summary judgment on the ground that the claim term “in spaced relationship with each other” failed the definiteness requirement. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that a patent claim passes the threshold so long as the claim is “amenable to construction,” and, as construed, is not “insolubly ambiguous.” The Supreme Court vacated. A patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the patent’s specification and prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention. Section 112’s definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent limitations of language. The standard mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable. The Federal Circuit inquired whether the claims were “amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous,” but such formulations lack the precision section 112 demands. To tolerate imprecision just short of that rendering a claim “insolubly ambiguous” would diminish the definiteness requirement’s public-notice function and foster the innovation-discouraging “zone of uncertainty.” The Court remanded so that the Federal Circuit can reconsider, under the proper standard, whether the relevant claims in the 753 patent are sufficiently definite. View "Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc" on Justia Law

The Patent Act provides: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party,” 35 U.S.C. 285. The Federal Circuit has interpreted section 285 as authorizing fee awards only “when there has been some material inappropriate conduct,” or when it is both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” A health insurance company obtained a declaratory judgment that a patent was invalid and not infringed. The district court found the case “exceptional” and awarded attorney fees of $4,694,727.40, $209,626.56 in expenses, and $375,400.05 in expert fees. The court found a pattern of “vexatious” and “deceitful” conduct by the defendant in attempting to force other companies to purchase licenses, even after its own experts determined that its claims lacked merit. The Federal Circuit reviewed the determination de novo and reversed in part. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. All aspects of a district court’s exceptional-case determination should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. That determination is based on statutory text that emphasizes that the district court is better positioned to make the “multifarious and novel” determination, which is not susceptible to “useful generalization” of the sort that de novo review provides, and is “likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of discretion rule will permit to develop.” The word “exceptional” should be given its ordinary meaning: “one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated,” considering the totality of the circumstances. View "Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

The Patent Act authorizes district courts to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases,” 35 U.S.C. 285. In Brooks Furniture, the Federal Circuit defined an “exceptional case” as one which either involves “material inappropriate conduct” or is both “objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith” as shown by clear and convincing evidence. ICON sued Octane for patent infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to Octane, but denied attorney’s fees under section 285. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Brooks Furniture framework “unduly rigid’ in light of the statutory grant of discretion to district courts. Section 285 imposes only one constraint on the award of attorney’s fees, limiting it to “exceptional” cases. Because the Patent Act does not define “exceptional,” the term should be given it ordinary meaning: “uncommon,” “rare,” or “not ordinary.” An “exceptional” case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both governing law and the facts) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated. District courts may determine whether a case is “exceptional” in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances. The Brooks Furniture standard was so demanding that it appeared to render section 285 superfluous of the courts’ inherent power to award fees in cases involving misconduct or bad faith. Section 285 imposes no specific evidentiary burden. View "Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc." on Justia Law