Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

Pacing’s 843 patent is directed to methods and systems for pacing users during activities that involve repeated motions, such as running, cycling, and swimming. The preferred embodiment of the patent describes a method for aiding a user’s pacing by providing a tempo (for example, the beat of a song or flashes of light) corresponding to the user’s desired pace. Pacing alleged that Garmin GPS fitness watches and microcomputers used by runners and bikers infringed the patent. The Garmin Connect website allows users to design and transfer workouts to the Garmin devices. Workouts consist of a series of intervals to which the user can assign a duration and target pace value. The devices display the intervals of a particular workout, for example, by counting down the time for which the user intends to maintain a particular pace. The devices may also display actual pace, e.g., 50 to 70 steps per minute. The devices do not play music or output a beat. The Federal Circuit affirmed entry of summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of Garmin. Merely displaying the rate of a user’s pace—for example, “100 steps per minute”—does not produce a sensible tempo; Garmin’s devices are not repetitive motion pacing devices. View "Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Soverain Software sued Victoria’s Secret and Avon for infringement of its patents relating to virtual shopping carts and to using a hypertext statement so that users can access information about past orders. The district court found that defendants infringed certain claims and that those claims were not invalid. After the district court’s judgment, the Federal Circuit, in 2013, decided Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., finding certain of the claims invalid as obvious The Federal Circuit then reversed as to Victoria’s Secret and Avon, holding that issue preclusion applies as a result of the Newegg case, and that the asserted claims here are therefore invalid. View "Soverain Software, LLC v. Victoria's Secret Direct Brand Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

United owns three patents that recite systems for using a landline telephone connection for both voice communication and data transmission. They are directed to the use of exchanges that combine the voice and data components of the signal for transmission over the telephone line, and filters that separate those components so that they can be received as separate voice and data signals by a user. In 2002, United’s predecessor sued EarthLink, charging direct infringement because EarthLink offered its customers an Internet connection service based on a broadband digital communications technology, Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL). EarthLink argued that the accused ADSL system did not include a “telephone device” as required by all asserted claims. The jury returned a general verdict of non-infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion. In 2011, United sued CenturyTel and Qwest for infringing the same claims of the three patents. The district court dismissed on collateral estoppel grounds, noting that United did not articulate how the defendants’ systems were different from the systems that were the subjects of the Earthlink trial other than that the defendants’ services included telephone devices. The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that the earlier verdict could have been based on several grounds. View "United Access Techs., LLC v. CenturyTel Broadband Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Fenner’s 706 patent is directed to personal communication services (PCS) systems, whereby users are provided with the ability to access a communications network from diverse locations. Before the development of PCS systems, call servicing and billing were specific to a particular communications device at a fixed location. In PCS systems, telephone service can be identified independent of a telephone unit, and each user of a particular device has a personal identification number by which call servicing and billing are identified with the user, and not with a particular telephone unit. The district court entered summary judgment, finding that Verizon did not infringe claim 1 of the patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s construction of the term “personal identification number,” as “a number separate from a billing code (as construed herein), identifying an individual system user, which is associated with the individual and not the device” and of “billing code” to mean “a code separate from the personal identification number (as construed herein), identifying a particular billing authority (as construed herein).” View "Fenner Inv., Ltd. v. Cellco P'ship" on Justia Law

Garmin petitioned the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for inter partes review (IPR) of claims 10, 14, and 17 of the Cuozzo’s 074 patent, entitled “Speed Limit Indicator and Method for Displaying Speed and the Relevant Speed Limit,” issued in 2004. The patent discloses an interface which displays a vehicle’s current speed with the speed limit. In one embodiment, a red filter is superimposed on a white speedometer so that speeds above the legal speed limit are displayed in red while the legal speeds are displayed in white. A GPS unit tracks the vehicle’s location and identifies the speed limit at that location. The red filter automatically rotates when the speed limit changes. The PTO granted IPR. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued a final decision finding claims 10, 14, and 17 obvious and denied Cuozzo’s motion to amend the patent by substituting new claims 21, 22, and 23 for claims 10, 14, and 17. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the PTO’s decision to institute IPR and that there was no error in the Board’s claim construction under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the obviousness determination, or denial of Cuozzo’s motion to amend. View "In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC" on Justia Law

The descriptions for Papst Licensing’s 399 and449 patents are largely the same, the 449 patent having issued on a divisional application carved out of the application that became the 399 patent. The focus of both is an interface device for transferring data between an input/output data device and a host computer. The district court, applying and elaborating on its constructions of various claim terms, entered summary judgment of non-infringement, concluding that none of the accused digital cameras come within any of the asserted claims. The Federal Circuit vacated the summary judgment of non-infringement, rejecting the court’s constructions of construction of “interface device,” “second connecting device,” “data transmit/receive device,” “virtual file,” and “input/output device customary in a host device.” View "Papst Licensing GMBH v. Fujifilm Corp." on Justia Law

Imes’s U.S. patent application no. 09/874,423 is directed to a device for communicating digital camera image and video information over a network. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the examiner’s rejections of all pending claims 1-14 and 16-47 as either anticipated by or obvious over various references. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded with respect to independent claims 1-5 and 34-47. The Board’s construction of “wireless” to include communications along metal contacts of the removable memory card and the computer system was inconsistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation in view of the specification. The Board’s conclusion that a prior patent discloses a communications module operable to wirelessly communicate streaming video to a destination was not supported by substantial evidence. Imes did not challenge the rejections of claims 6-14 and 16-33. View "In re: Imes" on Justia Law

Teva’s patent covers a multiple sclerosis drug. When Sandoz tried to market a generic version of the drug, Teva sued for infringement. Sandoz countered that the patent was invalid because a claim that the active ingredient had “a molecular weight of 5 to 9 kilodaltons” was indefinite under 35 U. S. C. 112, for not stating which of three methods was used to determine that weight. The district court upheld the patent. Reversing, the Federal Circuit reviewed all aspects of claim construction de novo, including the determination of subsidiary facts. The Supreme Court vacated. When reviewing a district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters made during construction of a patent claim, the Federal Circuit must apply a “clear error,” not a de novo, standard of review. FRCP 52(a)(6) states: a court of appeals must not set aside “[f]indings of fact” unless they are “clearly erroneous.” Clear error review is particularly important in patent cases because a district judge has more opportunity to gain “familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles” than an appeals judge who must read a written transcript. When reviewing only evidence intrinsic to the patent, the judge’s determination is a determination of law, and the court of appeals will review that construction de novo; where the court needs to consult disputed extrinsic evidence to understand, for example, background science, courts need to make subsidiary factual findings about the extrinsic evidence. The ultimate construction of the claim is a legal conclusion subject to de novo review, but to overturn resolution of an underlying factual dispute, the appellate court must find that the judge, in respect to those findings, committed clear error. Here, the district court made a factual finding, crediting Teva’s expert’s account about how a skilled artisan would understand molecular weights. When the Federal Circuit reviewed the decision, it failed to accept that explanation without finding that the determination was “clearly erroneous.” View "Teva Pharma. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, NeuroRepair retained Nath Law Group for prosecution of patent applications. NeuroRepair became dissatisfied and requested that Nath transfer its files to another law firm to continue prosecution before the USPTO. Nath withdrew from representation of NeuroRepair before the USPTO, but continued to assist NeuroRepair with other matters. NeuroRepair filed suit in 2009, alleging professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of written contract, breach of oral contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, and false promise. Nath removed the case to federal court on the ground that it was “a civil action relating to patents.” After judgment in Nath’s favor in 2012, NeuroRepair appealed, challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 pronouncement in Gunn v. Minto. The Federal Circuit vacated, with instructions to remand to California state court; no federal issue is necessarily raised, because any federal issues raised are not substantial in the relevant sense. Federal court resolution of malpractice claims that do not raise substantial issues of federal law would usurp the important role of state courts in regulating the practice of law within their boundaries, disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. View "NeoroRepair, Inc. v. Nath Law Grp." on Justia Law

The application from which the 135 patent issued (28 years later) was filed in 1974. The patent relates to prosthetic vascular grafts made of highly-expanded polytetrafluoroethylene (ePTFE), consisting of solid nodes of PTFE connected by thin PTFE fibrils. The graft formed by ePFTE is homogeneously porous: a structure that allows uniform cell regrowth to establish a firm integration of the graft into the body. The different claims of the patent are directed to grafts made of ePTFE with varying intermodal distances, which are also called fibril lengths. It is sold by Gore under as “Gore-Tex.” In 2003, BPV and Dr. Goldfarb sued Gore for infringement. A jury found the patent valid and that Gore willfully infringed. The Federal Circuit affirmed in 2012, but granted rehearing and vacated for the limited purpose of addressing willfulness, enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. On remand, the district court again found that Gore, as a “reasonable litigant,” could not have realistically expected its defenses to succeed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that neither BPV nor Goldfarb had standing to sue for infringement and holding that Gore’s position was not susceptible to a reasonable conclusion that the patent was invalid on inventorship grounds. View "Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law