Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

WesternGeco’s patents relate to technologies used to search for oil and gas beneath the ocean floor. Ships tow long streamers equipped with sensors. An airgun bounces sound waves off of the ocean floor. The sensors pick up the returning sound waves and create a map of the subsurface geology to aid in identifying drilling locations. The streamers can be miles long and can tangle or drift apart, resulting in distorted maps. The patents relate to controlling the streamers and sensors in relation to each other by using winged positioning devices and generating four-dimensional maps with which it is possible to see changes in the seabed over time. WesternGeco manufactures the Q-Marine, and performs surveys for oil companies. ION manufactures the DigiFIN, and sells to its customers, who perform surveys for oil companies. WesternGeco filed suit. A jury found infringement and no invalidity and awarded $93,400,000 in lost profits and $12,500,000 in reasonable royalties. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that WesternGeco was not the owner of the patents and lacked standing and that the court applied an incorrect standard under 35 U.S.C. 271(f)(1). The court upheld denial of enhanced damages for willful infringement and reversed the award of lost profits resulting from conduct occurring abroad. View "WesternGeco L.L.C. v. Ion Geophysical Corp." on Justia Law

SpeedTrack’s patent, entitled “Method for Accessing Computer Files and Data, Using Linked Categories Assigned to Each Data File Record on Entry of the Data File Record,” describes methods for searching and accessing files stored on a computer system. The claimed methods require use of: “category descriptions,” corresponding to stored files; a “file information directory” containing information linking “category descriptions” to specific system files; and a “search filter,” to locate files that have “category descriptions” matching those in the filter. SpeedTrack sued, alleging that Walmart’s online retail website infringed the patent by permitting visitors to search for available products by selecting pre-defined descriptive categories. Walmart licensed and used Endeca’s software to achieve this functionality. After reexamination by the PTO, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement , finding that, because the accused Endeca software uses numerical identifiers instead of descriptive words, users did not use “category descriptions” required by the patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed the claim construction. Speedtrack later sued Office Depot. The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment as a matter of law, finding that SpeedTrack’s claims were barred by res judicata and under the “Kessler doctrine,” which bars suits against customers for use of a product previously found not to infringe in a suit against the product’s supplier. View "SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

In earlier litigation, Teva challenged the validity and enforceability of GSK’s patents on lamotrigine, Lamictal’s active ingredient. Teva was first to file an FDA application, alleging invalidity or nonenforceability, and seeking approval to produce generic lamotrigine tablets and chewable tablets for markets alleged to be annually worth $2 billion and $50 million,. If the patent suit resulted in a determination of invalidity or nonenforceability—or a settlement incorporating such terms—Teva would be statutorily entitled to a 180- day period of market exclusivity, during which time only it and GSK could produce generic lamotrigine tablets. After the judge ruled the patent’s main claim invalid, the companies settled; Teva would end its patent challenge in exchange for early entry into the chewables market and GSK’s commitment not to produce its own, “authorized generic” Lamictal tablets. Plaintiffs, direct purchasers of Lamictal, sued under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 & 2, claiming that the agreement was a “reverse payment” intended to induce Teva to abandon the patent fight and eliminate the risk of competition in the lamotrigine tablet market for longer than the patent would otherwise permit. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, citing Supreme Court precedent, holding that unexplained large payments from the holder of a drug patent to an alleged infringer to settle litigation of the patent’s validity or infringement (reverse payment) can violate antitrust laws. View "King Drug Co of Florence Inc, v. Smithkline Beecham Corp." on Justia Law

Under 35 U.S.C. 154, the PTO must extend a patent term if issue of an original patent is delayed due to the failure of the Patent and Trademark Office to provide notifications under section 132 or a notice of allowance not later than 14 months after the date of filing. Delay adjustment is statutorily reduced for delays attributable to unreasonable prosecution efforts. When an application has claims drawn to multiple inventions, the PTO may issue a restriction, requiring the applicant to prosecute only one of the inventions as part of that application. For remaining inventions, the applicant may file a divisional application, which has the benefit of the filing date of the original application. Mohsenzadeh filed the 905 application. Though the 14-month notification period ended in September 2002, the PTO notified Mohsenzadeh of a restriction requirement in September 2006. The claims Mohsenzadeh elected to prosecute issued in 2010 as the 984 patent. The PTO granted an adjustment of 2,104 days, including 1,476 days attributable to the time between when notice was due and when the PTO provided notice of the restriction. Mohsenzadeh filed divisional applications; patents issued in January 2013 and March 2013. Both claim priority to the 984 patent. The PTO granted no term adjustment. Mohsenzadeh argued that each was entitled to the 1,476 days. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. Section 154 requires a term adjustment for delays that occurred during prosecution of the actual application from which the patent directly issued, not the application from which it derived priority. View "Mohsenzadeh v. Lee" on Justia Law

Gaymar ‘s patent is directed to a patient temperature control system, including a blanket that can conductively warm or cool the patient. In 2008, Gaymar sued CSZ, asserting that CSZ’s Blanketrol device infringed claims of the patent. The PTO granted CSZ’s inter partes reexamination request and issued a first Office Action rejecting all claims of the patent as anticipated or obvious over prior art cited in CSZ’s request. The district court denied Gaymar’s motion for a preliminary injunction and granted CSZ’s motion to stay the case pending the conclusion of the reexamination. The PTO reaffirmed its rejection of all claims of the patent. Gaymar filed an express abandonment of all claims in 2010, and the PTO concluded the reexamination, cancelling all of the claims. The district court lifted the stay. CSZ unsuccessfully sought attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, alleging that Gaymar’s litigation position was frivolous and that Gaymar had engaged in litigation misconduct. Following the Supreme Court’s 2014, decision, Octane Fitness, CSZ unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of a lack of objective baselessness, but reversed the exceptional case finding insofar as it was based on CSZ’s purported misconduct. View "Gaymar Indus., Inc. v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Fluorescent lamp fixtures typically regulate electric current by an electronic ballast, which maintains current levels high enough to start the lamp but prevents current from reaching destructive levels. When a lamp is removed from its holders or when a filament is broken, current provided by the ballast ceases to flow and dissipates back into the ballast, which can destroy the ballast and create an electric shock hazard. LB’s 529 patent discloses an electronic ballast able to shield itself from destructive levels of current. LB sued ULT, asserting infringement. ULT argued that the term “voltage source means” is governed by 35 U.S.C. 112 and that the claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 12 as indefinite because the specification fails to disclose what structure corresponded to the “voltage source means” limitation. The district court concluded that the term “voltage source means” had sufficient structure. A jury awarded LB $3 million in damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that claim construction is an issue of law that it reviews de novo. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its holding in Teva Pharmaceuticals (2015), that while the ultimate question of claim construction is a legal question, there may be underlying “subsidiary” factual findings related to the extrinsic record that are reviewed for clear error. On remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed. Because the district court’s factual findings demonstrate that the claims convey sufficient structure, it was correct to conclude that the term “voltage source means” is not governed by section 112. View "Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics, NA" on Justia Law

The 505 Patent claims “the use of a conventional web browser Back and Forward navigational functionalities without data loss in an online application consisting of dynamically generated web pages,” “retaining information lost in the navigation of online forms.” The district court rejected an infringement suit, deeming this to be an abstract concept, ineligible for patenting, 35 U.S.C. 101. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that by setting out the abstract idea of a known technological challenge without setting out any specific disclosures, the Patent “added no elements or combination of elements, sometimes referred to as the inventive concept, sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law or the abstract idea. View "Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc." on Justia Law

On the day the RE 048 patent issued, Pfizer filed suit against five generic drug manufacturers, alleging infringement. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in part in part, finding that the RE 048 patent was not a valid reissue patent, because Pfizer’s asserted error of prosecuting a prior patent application as a continuation-in-part, rather than as a divisional, was not correctable by reissue under section 251. The court further found that the safe harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. 121 did not apply to the RE 048 patent, and that the relevant claims of the RE 048 patent were invalid for obviousness-type double patenting in light of an earlier patent. A final judgment of invalidity was entered against Pfizer. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The applications from which the two patents issued do not share “common lineage in the divisional chain,” they are not derived from the same restriction requirement. Restriction requirements (1994 and 1997) were not imposed on the same compound, composition, and method-of-use claims. View "G.D. Searle LLC v. Lupin Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law

Marvel Entertainment’s corporate predecessor agreed to purchase Kimble’s patent for a Spider-Man toy in exchange for a lump sum plus a 3% royalty on future sales. The agreement set no end date for royalties. As the patent neared the end of its statutory 20-year term, Marvel discovered Brulotte v. Thys Co., in which the Supreme Court held that a patentee cannot continue to receive royalties for sales made after his patent expires and sought a declaratory judgment that it could stop paying Kimble royalties. The district court granted relief. The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed, adhering to Brulotte. A patent typically expires 20 years from its application date. 35 U S.C. 154(a)(2). At that point, the unrestricted right to make or use the article passes to the public. The Brulotte rule may prevent some parties from entering into deals they desire, but parties can often find ways to achieve similar outcomes. Congress, moreover, has had multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte and has even rejected bills that would have replaced Brulotte’s per se rule with the rule of reason standard. Congress, not the Court, gets to make patent policy. View "Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC" on Justia Law

The 836 patent describes “[a] method and device for generating, merging and updating data” that can then be used to provide a mobile unit with current, and continuously updated, accurate road network, route, and traffic information, “to establish a method to generate appropriate data utilizable for a practical destination tracking system which carries out a permanent self-updating and with data generation which requires little effort. The method is also appropriate for deriving destination tracking data from the data generated in accordance with the aforesaid method.” Claim 1, the only asserted independent claim, indicates that, as the mobile unit (e.g., an automobile) travels, its location is determined at set time intervals and it generates and stores the data measured at each node. In a suit accusing TomTom’s customer of infringing the patent’s European counterpart, TomTom sought a declaratory judgment that the 836 patent was invalid as obvious and anticipated. The court construed: “destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit,” “generating and updating data for use in,” “node,” and “the storage device,” the parties requested judgment of non-infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the terms should be construed to reflect their plain and ordinary meaning. View "TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph" on Justia Law