Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

The patent, titled “Man Machine Interface via Display Peripheral” is directed to a remote control device for making selections on television or computer screens. Claim 1 requires that the device be “adapted to be held by the human hand” and a multi-function “thumb switch being adapted for activation by a human thumb.” On ex parte reexamination, the examiner rejected claims as anticipated and obvious, 35 U.S.C. 103, relying primarily on Japanese Patent 634, which discloses a desk-bound mouse with a locking key surrounded by four moving keys operable by a user’s finger to control cursor movement on a screen. The examiner construed “adapted to be held by the human hand” broadly to include various “forms of grasp or grasping by a user’s hand,” such as grasping the mouse disclosed in J634, and similarly interpreted the claim term “thumb switch” broadly, as “merely requir[ing] that a switch . . . be capable of being enabled/activated by a thumb but . . . not preclud[ing] another digit, i.e. index finger.” The Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed the anticipation rejection based on improper claim construction, but held that, even properly construed, certain claims would have been obvious under J634. The court remanded for determination of whether certain claims would have been obvious under the correct claim constructions. View "In Re: Man Machine Interface Tech., LLC" on Justia Law

Coleman sells an array of products, including personal flotation devices and owns the D714 patent, which claims “[t]he ornamental design for a personal flotation device” with two arm bands connected to a torso piece. The torso piece is flat on its back and tapers toward a connecting strap on its sides. Sport Dimension sells water-sports-related equipment, including its Body Glove® line of personal flotation devices, which also have two armbands connected to a torso piece. Unlike Coleman’s design, the torso section in the Body Glove® device extends upwards to form a vest that goes over a person’s shoulders. Sport Dimension sought a declaratory judgment that it did not infringe the D714 patent and that the patent is invalid. The district court excluded Coleman’s expert, stating that he “appears to possess substantial experience in the field of industrial design … [but] has no substantive experience in the narrower field of personal flotation device design” and entered judgment of noninfringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed exclusion of the expert, but vacated the judgment, rejecting the district court’s claim construction, which eliminated several features of Coleman’s claimed design, specifically the armbands and the side torso tapering. View "Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., Inc." on Justia Law

GTG’s 179 patent claims methods of analyzing sequences of genomic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) for decoding genetic variations. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of GTG’s infringement suit, finding certain claims ineligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. 101. The court stated that GTG’s attempts to distinguish its position on the ground that the method of the claim is useful “have no basis in case law or in logic.” The claim ineligible for claiming unpatentable subject matter, not for lack of utility; even valuable contributions can fall short of statutory patentable subject matter. View "Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C." on Justia Law

Rembrandt sued, alleging that JJVC’s Acuvue Advance® and Oasys® contact lenses infringed Rembrandt’s patent. Rembrandt relied on expert testimony from Dr. Beebe, who presented test results, to prove that the accused lenses met the “surface layer” and “soft” claim limitations. During cross-examination, Beebe drastically changed his testimony regarding his testing methodology. JJVC relied on expert testimony from Dr. Bielawski that its lenses did not meet the “surface layer” limitation, but did not present expert testimony concerning the “soft” limitation. In his testimony, Bielawski impugned Beebe’s credibility. The court ultimately struck Beebe’s testimony regarding the testing and granted judgment as a matter of law that Rembrandt failed to prove that the accused lenses were “soft.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. After trial, Rembrandt received information suggesting that Bielawski testified falsely. Although the court denied Rembrandt’s request for post-trial discovery, Rembrandt received much of what it sought from Bielawski’s employer, the University of Texas, through an open records request. The parties no longer dispute that Bielawski testified falsely on material issues. The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial. The district court erred in requiring proof that JJVC or its counsel was complicit in Bielawski’s false testimony. View "Rembrandt Vision Techs., L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc." on Justia Law

Pride Mobility and Permobil compete for sales of power wheelchairs. Pride’s 598 and 343 patents disclose wheelchairs that raise their front wheels (called caster wheels) in response to torque from the chairs’ motors, enhancing the capacity of the chairs to travel stably over obstacles. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes reviews of the patents on petitions filed by Permobil, under 35 U.S.C. 311, and cancelled all claims of both patents for obviousness. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, finding that the Board misconstrued claim 7 of the 343 patent, which requires a “substantially planar” mounting plate “oriented perpendicular” to the axis of the claimed wheelchair’s drive wheel. The court affirmed as to all other claims, rejecting an argument that the Board erred in concluding that a relevant skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the claimed wheelchair by lowering the position of a pivot in a prior-art wheelchair. View "Pride Mobility Prods. Corp. v. Permobil, Inc." on Justia Law

Pride Mobility and Permobil compete for sales of power wheelchairs. Pride’s 598 and 343 patents disclose wheelchairs that raise their front wheels (called caster wheels) in response to torque from the chairs’ motors, enhancing the capacity of the chairs to travel stably over obstacles. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes reviews of the patents on petitions filed by Permobil, under 35 U.S.C. 311, and cancelled all claims of both patents for obviousness. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, finding that the Board misconstrued claim 7 of the 343 patent, which requires a “substantially planar” mounting plate “oriented perpendicular” to the axis of the claimed wheelchair’s drive wheel. The court affirmed as to all other claims, rejecting an argument that the Board erred in concluding that a relevant skilled artisan would have been motivated to make the claimed wheelchair by lowering the position of a pivot in a prior-art wheelchair. View "Pride Mobility Prods. Corp. v. Permobil, Inc." on Justia Law

MPHJ’s 381 patent, entitled “Distributed Computer Architecture and Process for Virtual Copying,” issued in 2004 and discloses a method and system that “extend[] the notion of copying . . . to a process that involves paper being scanned from a device at one location and copied to a device at another location.” “What makes Virtual Copier as simple as its physical counterpart . . . is the fact that it replicates the identical motions that a user who is making a copy using a physical photocopier goes through.” On inter partes review initiated by HP, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found certain claims not patentable as anticipated and one claim (13) not unpatentable as anticipated. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting HP’s argument that the PTO should have reviewed claim 13 to determine whether it was unpatentable as obvious. The court stated that it cannot review the decision not to institute. View "HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC" on Justia Law

MPHJ’s 381 patent, entitled “Distributed Computer Architecture and Process for Virtual Copying,” issued in 2004 and discloses a method and system that “extend[] the notion of copying . . . to a process that involves paper being scanned from a device at one location and copied to a device at another location.” “What makes Virtual Copier as simple as its physical counterpart . . . is the fact that it replicates the identical motions that a user who is making a copy using a physical photocopier goes through.” On inter partes review initiated by HP, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found certain claims not patentable as anticipated and one claim (13) not unpatentable as anticipated. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting HP’s argument that the PTO should have reviewed claim 13 to determine whether it was unpatentable as obvious. The court stated that it cannot review the decision not to institute. View "HP Inc. v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC" on Justia Law

Cardpool sued for infringement of its patent entitled “System and Method for Brand Name Gift Card Exchange.” Plastic Jungle’s defenses were obviousness, 35 U.S.C. 103, and that the claimed subject matter was patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. 101. The court agreed as to ineligibility and dismissed. Before an appeal was decided, Cardpool sought ex parte reexamination, 35 U.S.C. 304. Before reexamination was completed, the Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion the judgment of ineligibility under section 101. The PTO issued a Reexamination Certificate in 2014, finding amended claims and new claims patentable under section 103. The Federal Circuit then granted rehearing, vacated its summary affirmance of section 101 invalidity, and remanded to the district court, but declined to vacate the invalidity judgment. The district court declined the parties’ joint request for vacatur of its invalidity determination, stating that no Article III court had reviewed the Cardpool reexamined claims. The Federal CIrcuit affirmed: the denial was within the district court’s discretion and the premise of the motion was both speculative and inaccurate. The district court’s final judgment as to an original group of claims does not automatically render that judgment res judicata as to new claims granted upon reexamination. View "Cardpool, Inc. v. Plastic Jungle, Inc." on Justia Law

In the 1990s, AT&T obtained patents covering the transfer of packetized voice traffic between cellular base stations and switching centers. In 1996, AT&T assigned the patents to Lucent, which later assigned them to Avaya. In 2008, Avaya sold the patents for $2 million to High Point, reserving an interest in any proceeds obtained through litigation. High Point is based in Luxembourg and does not practice the patents. Within three days, High Point began sending demand letters asserting infringement, including to Sprint. Beginning in 1995, Sprint had built a network based on Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), which allows multiple cellphone users to share the same radio frequency. CDMA is now standard. AT&T (later Lucent) supplied equipment for the CDMA network. As that network grew, Sprint used unlicensed equipment from several vendors. In 2004, Sprint began upgrading the Lucent equipment with Motorola equipment. Motorola was not a party to the Lucent-Sprint licensing agreement. In 2006, Alcatel purchased Lucent. High Point claims that act terminated any license for Sprint’s use of Lucent equipment. Nortel began selling equipment to Sprint. Nortel was no longer a licensee to the patents. No infringement concerns were raised until 2008, when High Point sued, asserting violation of the licensing agreements and that the Sprint network operated through the combination of licensed and unlicensed equipment to facilitate the transmission of voice call traffic in an infringing manner. The Federal CIrcuit affirmed summary judgment, based on equitable estoppel. View "High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp." on Justia Law