Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

Grober invented a platform that stabilizes a camera for filming motion pictures from moving vehicles. Known in the entertainment industry as the Perfect Horizon, the technology won Grober an Academy Award in technical achievement. He received a patent, entitled “Autonomous Self Leveling, Self Correcting Stabilized Platform.” for the invention, designed to compensate for motion caused by waves, currents, wind, and other motion during land, air, and sea operations of a camera. Grober claimed infringement. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Federal Circuit vacated the claim construction and the grant of summary judgment and remanded. A patent is infringed if even a single claim is infringed and the district court misconstrued term “payload platform.” View "Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Antor owns the 961 patent relating “to a method and apparatus for transmitting information recorded on digital disks from a central server to subscribers via a high data rate telecommunications network.” The goal of the ’961 patent is to allow subscribers to access and to receive information (digital media such as music, images, documents, video, and software) stored on information systems over a telecommunications network. On reexamination the Patent and Trademark Office rejected the patent as anticipated and obvious over four references. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board correctly held that the existence of licenses under the patent is, alone, insufficient to overcome the prima facie case of obviousness View "In re: Antor Media Corp." on Justia Law

The two patents in suit relate to systems for minimizing the cost of placing long-distance telephone calls. Mediatrix manufactures and sells equipment that modifies existing telephone systems to convert them to voice-over-Internet-protocol systems. Over the course of infringement litigation, plaintiff (RTI) was ordered on four separate occasions to respond to a specific contention interrogatory propounded by Mediatrix: “Separately for each claim of the Patents-in-suit that [RTI] contends is infringed, state the basis for that contention, including without limitation, identification on an element-by-element basis of the component, structure, feature, functionality, method or process of each accused Mediatrix product that allegedly satisfies each element.” A magistrate determined that RTI never adequately responded to the interrogatory and that the failure to comply with the court’s orders was willful, and recommended dismissing the case and imposing monetary sanctions against RTI’s attorney, Hicks, and RTI in the amount of $86,965.81, to be split evenly between them. The district court adopted the recommendation. Hicks appealed the monetary sanction. RTI did not appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Rates Tech., Inc. v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc." on Justia Law

Bancorp owns the 792 and 037 patents, for tracking value of life insurance policies in separate accounts, under which the policy owner pays a premium beyond that required for the death benefit and specifies types of assets in which additional funds are invested. Corporations use the policies to insure employees’ lives and fund retirement benefits on a tax-advantaged basis. The value of a separate account policy fluctuates; owners must report the value of their policies. The patents provide a computerized means for tracking book and market values and calculating stable value guarantee. Bancorp sued Sun Life for infringement. In another suit, the court invalidated the 792 patent for indefiniteness. Bancorp and Sun Life stipulated to conditional dismissal on collateral estoppel. The Federal Circuit reversed the other case. The district court vacated dismissal then granted summary judgment of invalidity under section 101 (ineligible abstract ideas) without addressing claim construction and analyzing each claim as a process claim. Applying “the machine-or-transformation test,” specified computer components are only objects on which claimed methods operate, and the central processor is a general purpose computer programmed in an unspecified manner for a process that can be completed manually. The claims “do not transform the raw data into anything other than more data and are not representations of any physically existing objects.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada" on Justia Law

Schering held a patent on the controlled release coating applied to potassium chloride crystals for treatment of potassium deficiencies. Potential generic manufacturers filed an abbreviated application for approval (ANDA),Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-399, asserting that the Schering patent was invalid or would not be infringed by their new generic drugs. Schering’s subsequent infringement suits were resolved through agreements in which it paid the generic manufacturers to drop patent challenges and refrain from producing a generic drug for a specified period. Congress amended Hatch-Waxman to require pharmaceutical companies who enter into such settlements to file for antitrust review. The FTC filed an antitrust action with respect to Schering’s settlements. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of a class of purchasers of the drug. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the class, but reversed its presumption that Schering’s patent was valid and gave Schering the right to exclude infringing products until the end of its term, including through reverse payment settlements. The court directed use of a “quick look rule of reason analysis” based on economic realities of the settlement rather than labels. The court must treat any payment from a patent holder to a patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade, rebuttable by showing that the payment was for a purpose other than delayed entry or offers some pro-competitive benefit. View "In Re: K-Dur Antitrust Litigation" on Justia Law

LG took a license from Wi-LAN’s predecessor for a patent concerning V-chip technology for ratings-based blocking of television programs. LG subsequently claimed that it owed no royalties because its televisions did not practice Wi-LAN’s technology. Wi-LAN forwarded to LG a letter written by outside counsel (Townsend), naming Wi-LAN’s general counsel and vice president, as addressee. It was marked “CONFIDENTIAL” and contained analysis of Wi-LAN’s patent rights as applied to LG’s technology, opining that LG was practicing Wi-LAN’s technology and owed royalties. Wi-LAN’s disclosure of the letter was an intentional effort to convince LG to revise its position and pay royalties. Wi-LAN later sued for patent infringement, identifying Townsend as litigation counsel. LG served a subpoena on Townsend for documents and testimony relating to the subject matter of the letter, claiming that any privilege was absolutely waived by voluntary disclosure of the letter. Townsend unsuccessfully argued that any waiver should be limited to the letter. The district court found Townsend in contempt, and entered sanctions in the amount of LG’s costs and fees. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court erred by rejecting considerations of fairness: whether LG would be unfairly prejudiced by assertion of privilege beyond the four corners of the letter. View "Wi-LAN, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Loughlin filed application 624, which issued in 2008, as the 426 patent. In 2007, Ling filed the 404 application, which was granted priority benefit under 35 U.S.C. 120, from application 413, filed in January, 2004. All claim a “multiple function lock.” Ling, seeking to provoke an interference, copied claims from pending application 624. In 2010, the Patent and Trademark Office declared an interference between claim 1 of the 426 patent and claim 31 of Ling’s 404 application. Loughlin asserted that, under 35 U.S.C. 135(b)(2), Ling was barred from provoking an interference because Ling’s attempt to copy the claim from Loughlin’s published application was untimely; Ling’s 404 application is “an application filed” after the publication date of Loughlin’s 624 application and Ling copied Loughlin’s claim more than one year after its publication date. The Board denied Loughlin’s motion, finding that the bar does not apply to an application filed before a published application. Ling’s 404 application, having an effective filing date of January 2004, was not an application filed after Loughlin’s application, published November 2004. The Board cancelled claim 1 of the 426 patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Loughlin v. Ling" on Justia Law

A subsidiary of Marathon hired Preston as a relief pumper in Marathon’s coal bed methane well operation. After beginning work, Preston signed an Employee Agreement containing the assignment at issue. Later, Preston worked with Marathon Engineer Smith on a baffle system to improve machinery used to extract methane gas from water-saturated coal in a coal bed methane gas well. Marathon installed the system on wells. After Preston’s employment ended, both Marathon and Preston pursued patents. The district court declared that Preston is the sole inventor of one patent and that Smith was misjoined as an inventor; ordered the PTO to issue a new certificate reflecting Preston as the sole inventor; declared Marathon the owner of other patents pursuant to the employment agreement and that Preston breached the agreement for failing to assign his rights. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Marathon on its shop right claim, finding that, even if Marathon did not own the patents, it had a shop right to practice the inventions. The Federal Circuit affirmed that Preston assigned his rights in two inventions to Marathon pursuant to his employment agreement. Because that assignment was automatic, there was no breach of that agreement. View "Preston v. Marathon Oil Co." on Justia Law

RTI owns patents relating to the automatic routing of telephone calls based upon cost. Aware of infringement by Speakeasy, a telecommunications company, RTI offered to release Speakeasy from liability in exchange for a one-time payment under RTI’s tiered pricing structure. In 2007, the companies entered a “Covenant Not to Sue” with a payment of $475,000 to RTI, and a provision barring Speakeasy from challenging, or assisting others in challenging, the validity of the patents. The agreement defined “Speakeasy” to include both Speakeasy and Best Buy, which had previously announced plans to acquire Speakeasy. Three years later, Best Buy announced a plan to sell Speakeasy and merge it into Covad. RTI again learned of an infringement and notified Covad. Covad sought a declaratory judgment that the patents were invalid. The action was later dismissed voluntarily. RTI initiated the present lawsuit. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of licensee estoppel, under which a licensee of intellectual property “effectively recognizes the validity of that property and is estopped from contesting its validity,” is unenforceable in the context of challenges to patents, and that the no-challenge clause was contrary to the public interest in litigating the validity of patents. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc." on Justia Law

Alice Corporation owns three patents covering a computerized trading platform for exchanging obligations in which a trusted third party settles obligations between a first and second party so as to eliminate “settlement risk.” Settlement risk is the risk that only one party’s obligation will be paid, leaving the other party without its principal. The trusted third party eliminates this risk by either exchanging both parties’ obligations or exchanging neither obligation. CLS sought a declaration of invalidity; Alice counterclaimed infringement. The district court ruled in favor of CLS, holding that each asserted claim of the four patents is invalid for failure to claim patent eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit reversed. The system, method, and media claims at issue are not drawn to mere “abstract ideas” but are directed to practical applications of invention falling within the categories of patent eligible subject matter defined by 35 U.S.C. 101. View "CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd." on Justia Law