Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

Gaymar ‘s patent is directed to a patient temperature control system, including a blanket that can conductively warm or cool the patient. In 2008, Gaymar sued CSZ, asserting that CSZ’s Blanketrol device infringed claims of the patent. The PTO granted CSZ’s inter partes reexamination request and issued a first Office Action rejecting all claims of the patent as anticipated or obvious over prior art cited in CSZ’s request. The district court denied Gaymar’s motion for a preliminary injunction and granted CSZ’s motion to stay the case pending the conclusion of the reexamination. The PTO reaffirmed its rejection of all claims of the patent. Gaymar filed an express abandonment of all claims in 2010, and the PTO concluded the reexamination, cancelling all of the claims. The district court lifted the stay. CSZ unsuccessfully sought attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, alleging that Gaymar’s litigation position was frivolous and that Gaymar had engaged in litigation misconduct. Following the Supreme Court’s 2014, decision, Octane Fitness, CSZ unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of a lack of objective baselessness, but reversed the exceptional case finding insofar as it was based on CSZ’s purported misconduct. View "Gaymar Indus., Inc. v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Fluorescent lamp fixtures typically regulate electric current by an electronic ballast, which maintains current levels high enough to start the lamp but prevents current from reaching destructive levels. When a lamp is removed from its holders or when a filament is broken, current provided by the ballast ceases to flow and dissipates back into the ballast, which can destroy the ballast and create an electric shock hazard. LB’s 529 patent discloses an electronic ballast able to shield itself from destructive levels of current. LB sued ULT, asserting infringement. ULT argued that the term “voltage source means” is governed by 35 U.S.C. 112 and that the claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 12 as indefinite because the specification fails to disclose what structure corresponded to the “voltage source means” limitation. The district court concluded that the term “voltage source means” had sufficient structure. A jury awarded LB $3 million in damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that claim construction is an issue of law that it reviews de novo. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its holding in Teva Pharmaceuticals (2015), that while the ultimate question of claim construction is a legal question, there may be underlying “subsidiary” factual findings related to the extrinsic record that are reviewed for clear error. On remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed. Because the district court’s factual findings demonstrate that the claims convey sufficient structure, it was correct to conclude that the term “voltage source means” is not governed by section 112. View "Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics, NA" on Justia Law

The 505 Patent claims “the use of a conventional web browser Back and Forward navigational functionalities without data loss in an online application consisting of dynamically generated web pages,” “retaining information lost in the navigation of online forms.” The district court rejected an infringement suit, deeming this to be an abstract concept, ineligible for patenting, 35 U.S.C. 101. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that by setting out the abstract idea of a known technological challenge without setting out any specific disclosures, the Patent “added no elements or combination of elements, sometimes referred to as the inventive concept, sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law or the abstract idea. View "Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc." on Justia Law

On the day the RE 048 patent issued, Pfizer filed suit against five generic drug manufacturers, alleging infringement. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in part in part, finding that the RE 048 patent was not a valid reissue patent, because Pfizer’s asserted error of prosecuting a prior patent application as a continuation-in-part, rather than as a divisional, was not correctable by reissue under section 251. The court further found that the safe harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. 121 did not apply to the RE 048 patent, and that the relevant claims of the RE 048 patent were invalid for obviousness-type double patenting in light of an earlier patent. A final judgment of invalidity was entered against Pfizer. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The applications from which the two patents issued do not share “common lineage in the divisional chain,” they are not derived from the same restriction requirement. Restriction requirements (1994 and 1997) were not imposed on the same compound, composition, and method-of-use claims. View "G.D. Searle LLC v. Lupin Pharma., Inc." on Justia Law

Marvel Entertainment’s corporate predecessor agreed to purchase Kimble’s patent for a Spider-Man toy in exchange for a lump sum plus a 3% royalty on future sales. The agreement set no end date for royalties. As the patent neared the end of its statutory 20-year term, Marvel discovered Brulotte v. Thys Co., in which the Supreme Court held that a patentee cannot continue to receive royalties for sales made after his patent expires and sought a declaratory judgment that it could stop paying Kimble royalties. The district court granted relief. The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed, adhering to Brulotte. A patent typically expires 20 years from its application date. 35 U S.C. 154(a)(2). At that point, the unrestricted right to make or use the article passes to the public. The Brulotte rule may prevent some parties from entering into deals they desire, but parties can often find ways to achieve similar outcomes. Congress, moreover, has had multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte and has even rejected bills that would have replaced Brulotte’s per se rule with the rule of reason standard. Congress, not the Court, gets to make patent policy. View "Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC" on Justia Law

The 836 patent describes “[a] method and device for generating, merging and updating data” that can then be used to provide a mobile unit with current, and continuously updated, accurate road network, route, and traffic information, “to establish a method to generate appropriate data utilizable for a practical destination tracking system which carries out a permanent self-updating and with data generation which requires little effort. The method is also appropriate for deriving destination tracking data from the data generated in accordance with the aforesaid method.” Claim 1, the only asserted independent claim, indicates that, as the mobile unit (e.g., an automobile) travels, its location is determined at set time intervals and it generates and stores the data measured at each node. In a suit accusing TomTom’s customer of infringing the patent’s European counterpart, TomTom sought a declaratory judgment that the 836 patent was invalid as obvious and anticipated. The court construed: “destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit,” “generating and updating data for use in,” “node,” and “the storage device,” the parties requested judgment of non-infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the terms should be construed to reflect their plain and ordinary meaning. View "TomTom, Inc. v. Adolph" on Justia Law

Generic manufacturers submitted Abbreviated New Drug Applications seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of Copaxone®, to treat multiple sclerosis. Teva, which markets Copaxone®, sued for infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A). Its patents are listed in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations entry for Copaxone® and include claims reciting a product called copolymer-1 and two methods of making copolymer-1. The district court found that various claims were infringed, based on holdings regarding indefiniteness, nonenablement, and obviousness. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Group I claims are invalid for indefiniteness, but that Group II claims were not proven indefinite. The Supreme Court remanded, holding that the ultimate construction of a claim term is a question of law, subject to de novo review, and that underlying subsidiary fact findings are subject to clear error review. The Supreme Court also issued its opinion in Nautilus v. Biosig, addressing the standard for indefiniteness. Applying the standards set forth in those decisions, the Federal Circuit held that the Group I claims are invalid for indefiniteness. One statement contained a scientifically erroneous claim; given the specification and the prosecution history, the patentee failed to inform with reasonable certainty those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention. View "Teva Pharma. USA v. Sandoz, Inc." on Justia Law

Williamson's patent describes methods and systems for “distributed learning” that utilize standard computer hardware and software linked by a network to provide a virtual classroom. The system includes a presenter computer that controls information that appears on the audience member’s computer screen, audience computers that display the presentation and can communicate with the presenter and other audience members, and a distributed learning server that implements a “virtual classroom” over a network, such as the Internet. Williamson asserted infringement based on defendants’ alleged manufacture, sale, use, and importation of systems and methods of online collaboration. The district court construed “graphical display representative of a classroom” and “first graphical display comprising . . . a classroom region” as requiring “a pictorial map illustrating an at least partially virtual space in which participants can interact, and that identifies the presenter(s) and the audience member(s) by their locations on the map.” The court concluded that the limitation, “distributed learning control module,” was a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. 112(6) and that the specification failed to disclose necessary algorithms for performing all claimed functions, so that claims were invalid as indefinite. The Federal Circuit vacated. On rehearing, en banc, the court again vacated the judgment of non-infringement of certain claims, but found that the court correctly construed the limitation “distributed learning control module,” and affirmed the judgment of invalidity of other claim and remanded. View "Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC" on Justia Law

The 717 patent relates to a system for increasing the speed of data access in a packet-switched network, making use of “digital digests” that act as short digital fingerprints for the content of their corresponding documents. By communicating the smaller digital digests in place of the documents themselves, the invention reduces the redundant transmission of data throughout the network. On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board concluded that all of the challenged claims except claim 24 were unpatentable as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. 102 alone or additionally as obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103. The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s constructions of the term “gateway . . . between at least two other computers” in claims 6, 7, and 9 and the terms “sender/computer” and “receiver/computer” in claims 1, 3, 10, 22, and 23, and remanded its unpatentability determinations of those claims. The court affirmed the construction of the “searching” limitation in claim 22, the determination that claim 24 is patentable, the conclusion that claims 11, 12, and 14 were anticipated, and the Board’s denial of the patent owner’s motion to amend claims 1 and 3. View "Microsoft Corp. v.Proxyconn, Inc." on Justia Law

INTTRA owns patents relating to online methods for coordinating containerized shipping. GT sought a declaratory judgment that INTTRA’s shipping methods patents were invalid. While the case was pending, GT petitioned the PTO to review the patents as covered-business-method patents. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted review, but granted INTTRA leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that section 325(a)(1) barred the reviews because of the civil action. GT argued that INTTRA had waived that objection by not presenting it within the 14 days allowed by the rule giving a right to seek reconsideration. The Board granted INTTRA’s motion and “terminated” proceedings, without addressing patentability, reasoning that section 325(a)(1) is a statutory limit on Board “jurisdiction.” The Federal Circuit dismissed and denied mandamus relief. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. 325 declares that “review may not be instituted . . . if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner … filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” GT identified nothing that precludes the Board from reconsidering an initial institution decision or invoking the 325(a)(1) bar on its own, or inviting the patentee to file a motion after more than 14 days. View "GTNX, Inc.. v. INTTRA, Inc." on Justia Law