Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

Tre Milano challenged the validity of claims 1–5 and 11, and did not challenge the validity of claims 6–10 and 12–15 of the 118 Patent, which covers a device that automates the curling of hair. A strand of hair is fed into a chamber of the device, the hair is wound around a rotating curling member in the chamber, the wound hair is heated to preserve the curl, and the curled hair slides off the curling member and exits the chamber so that the curvature of the curls created by the device can be substantially maintained. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted Inter partes review of all of the claims that were challenged. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board erred in its finding of anticipation by erroneously construing two claim terms: “the length of hair can pass through the secondary opening” and “free end,” broadening the claims beyond the description in the 118 Patent specification. On the correct claim construction, the claims are not anticipated by prior art, 35 U.S.C. 102(b). View "TF3 Ltd. v. Tre Milano, LLC" on Justia Law

Raytheon produces infrared imaging equipment, including infrared cameras, which enable people to see in the dark and through obstructions such as smoke. Indigo’s founders included three former Raytheon employees. By 2000, Indigo was manufacturing and selling infrared cameras. In 2007, Raytheon sued, alleging patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation under California and Texas law. The district court granted Indigo summary judgment, finding Raytheon’s trade secrets claims time-barred. The parties settled Raytheon’s patent claims. The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that there were factual questions regarding when Raytheon should have become aware of its misappropriation cause of action and vacated the denial of Indigo’s motion for attorney fees under the under the Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA). On remand, a jury ruled in Indigo’s favor on all 31 alleged trade secrets. Raytheon unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law, contending that it had conclusively established misappropriation of two trade secrets. Indigo moved for attorney fees under the TTLA arguing Raytheon had withdrawn its TTLA claim to avoid an adverse ruling that California law, rather than Texas law, governed Raytheon’s misappropriation claims. Denying Indigo’s motion, the district court observed that Raytheon’s continued pursuit of its misappropriation claims under California law established that Raytheon’s withdrawal of its TTLA claim was not motivated by a desire to avoid an unfavorable ruling. The Federal Circuit affirmed both the judgment of no liability in favor of Indigo and the denial of attorney fees. View "Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Systems Corp." on Justia Law

Polara entered the accessible pedestrian signal systems (APS market) with an eight-wire system, the Navigator. Because many intersections only have two wires, installation of eight-wire systems could be difficult and labor-intensive. In 2000-2001, Polara engineers began designing a two-wire version of the Navigator, which led to the 476 patent, relating to a two-wire control system for push-button crosswalk stations for a traffic-light-controlled intersection with visual, audible, and tactile accessible signals. The patent discloses using “existing underground wire pairs to transmit power and data signals in order to generate the accessible signal functions for both sighted and visually impaired pedestrians.” Polara filed the application in August 2004. In September 2003, Polara began selling the Navigator-2, a two-wire APS system. In Polara’s infringement suit, the Federal Circuit rejected claims of invalidity and no willful infringement, based on prior public use and prior art, 35 U.S.C. 282. The court vacated an enhanced damages award and remanded for a more complete explanation, including a discussion of the public use defense, for the court’s exercise of its discretion, 35 U.S.C. 284. View "Polara Engineering Inc. v. Campbell Co." on Justia Law

The parties manufacture power supply controller chips--integrated circuits used in power supplies, such as chargers that transform AC electricity from an outlet into DC electricity, to power electronic devices. A switching regulator directs the transistor in the circuit when to turn on and off, to provide the desired amount of power. Power’s patents cover switching regulators. Prior-art regulators were inefficient during low power periods, creating loud noise and delivering power in an intermittent fashion. Power’s 079 patent addressed this problem by reducing the frequency of on/off cycles rather than by skipping cycles altogether, using feedback signals. Power’s 908 patent covers a power supply controller--an integrated circuit that can perform a variety of power-regulation functions. A jury found Fairchild literally infringed claims of the 079 patent and infringed two claims of the 908 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. Another jury awarded damages of roughly $140 million, finding that the entire market value rule applied in calculating damages for infringement of the 079 patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed judgments of infringement but vacated the award, concluding that the entire market value rule cannot be used to calculate damages. Power did not show that the patented feature was the sole driver of consumer demand, i.e., that it alone motivated consumers to buy the accused products. View "Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc." on Justia Law

Adidas sought inter partes review of Nike's 598 and 749 patents, arguing (ground 1) that each challenged claim would have been obvious based on the Reed and Nishida references and (ground 2) that each claim would have been obvious based on the Castello, Fujiwara, and Nishida references. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted inter partes review and held that Adidas had not met its burden of demonstrating any of the claims would have been obvious based on ground 1 without addressing the merits of ground 2 or suggesting that its conclusions as to ground 1 would be dispositive as to ground 2. After the Supreme Court issued its 2018 "SAS" decision, Adidas sought remand, arguing that SAS requires that the Board institute on all grounds raised in the Petition. The Patent Office recently issued public guidance indicating that, in light of SAS, if a trial is instituted, the Board will institute review on all challenges raised in the petitions. The Federal Circuit ordered a remand, quoting the Court: “the petitioner’s contentions, not the Director’s discretion, define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to conclusion.” View "Adidas AG v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law

Triptans are selective serotonin receptor agonists, developed in the 1980s. When Zolmitriptan became available in the U.S. in oral tablet form in 1999 under the name Zomig® it was among several triptans on the market or under development. AstraZeneca owns the 237 and 767 patents, which relate to formulations of zolmitriptan for intranasal administration, and the New Drug Application for Zomig® (zolmitriptan) Nasal Spray, approved by the FDA for treatment of migraines. The patents are listed in connection with Zomig® Nasal Spray in the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book). In 2012, AstraZeneca and Impax entered into an agreement, granting Impax an exclusive license to AstraZeneca’s patents covering the Zomig® products, for the payment of $130 million and additional payments at varying royalty rates. In 2014, Lannett notified AstraZeneca that it had filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application, seeking approval for a generic version of Zomig® Nasal Spray, with a Paragraph IV certification (21 U.S.C. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)), alleging noninfringement or invalidity of the 237 and 767 patents. In the subsequent infringement suit, 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A), the district court issued its claim construction opinion, the parties stipulated to infringement, and the court held that Lannett failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims were invalid or would have been obvious over prior art. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the entry of an injunction. View "Impax Laboratories Inc. v. Lannett Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

WesternGeco owns patents for a system used to survey the ocean floor. ION sold a competing system, built from components manufactured in the U.S., then shipped abroad for assembly into a system indistinguishable from WesternGeco’s. WesternGeco sued for patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. 271(f)(1) and (f)(2). The jury awarded WesternGeco royalties and lost profits under section 284. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that WesternGeco’s award for lost profits was a permissible domestic application of section 284 of the Patent Act, not an impermissible extraterritorial application of section 271. To determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, courts must identify the statute’s "focus” and ask whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in U.S. territory. If so, the case involves a permissible domestic application of the statute. When determining the statute’s focus, the provision at issue must be assessed in concert with other provisions. Section 284, the general damages provision, focuses on “the infringement.” The “overriding purpose” is “complete compensation” for infringements. Section 271 identifies several ways that a patent can be infringed; to determine section 284’s focus in a given case, the type of infringement must be identified. Section 271(f)(2) was the basis for WesternGeco’s claim and damages. That provision regulates the domestic act of “suppl[ying] in or from the United States,” and vindicates domestic interests, The focus of section 284 in a case involving infringement under section 271(f)(2) is the act of exporting components from the U.S., so the relevant conduct occurred in the U.S. Damages are not the statutory focus but are merely the means by which the statute remedies infringements. The overseas events giving rise to the lost-profit damages here were merely incidental to the infringement. View "WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp." on Justia Law

Sirona’s 006 patent “relates to a method for producing a drill assistance device,” a drill template, “to precisely place a pilot hole for a tooth implant, wherein the pilot hole for the tooth implant is aligned relative to the teeth that still remain in the jaw.” The specification discloses taking X-ray images of the jaw and taking a three-dimensional optical image of the visible surfaces of the jaw and teeth. These images are compiled into “measured data records” and correlated. From this correlation, the position for the implant is determined and a drill template is prepared. On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found claims 1–8 of unpatentable as obvious, 35 U.S.C. 103, over the combination of a German Patent (Bannuscher) and a U.S. Patent (Truppe), and denied Sirona’s contingent motion to amend the claims. The Board found patentable claims 9–10. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Substantial evidence supports that claims 1–8 would have been obvious over the combination of Bannuscher and Truppe; the Board’s unpatentability determination did not deviate from the grounds alleged in the petition. Petitioners failed to demonstrate claims 9–10 were unpatentable. The court vacated the denial of the contingent motion to amend and remanded. View "Sirona Dental Systems GMBH v. Institut Straumann AG" on Justia Law

Sirona’s 006 patent “relates to a method for producing a drill assistance device,” a drill template, “to precisely place a pilot hole for a tooth implant, wherein the pilot hole for the tooth implant is aligned relative to the teeth that still remain in the jaw.” The specification discloses taking X-ray images of the jaw and taking a three-dimensional optical image of the visible surfaces of the jaw and teeth. These images are compiled into “measured data records” and correlated. From this correlation, the position for the implant is determined and a drill template is prepared. On inter partes review, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board found claims 1–8 of unpatentable as obvious, 35 U.S.C. 103, over the combination of a German Patent (Bannuscher) and a U.S. Patent (Truppe), and denied Sirona’s contingent motion to amend the claims. The Board found patentable claims 9–10. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Substantial evidence supports that claims 1–8 would have been obvious over the combination of Bannuscher and Truppe; the Board’s unpatentability determination did not deviate from the grounds alleged in the petition. Petitioners failed to demonstrate claims 9–10 were unpatentable. The court vacated the denial of the contingent motion to amend and remanded. View "Sirona Dental Systems GMBH v. Institut Straumann AG" on Justia Law

FastShip’s patents, entitled “Monohull Fast Sealift or Semi-Planing Monohull Ship,” relate to a “fast ship whose hull design in combination with a waterjet propulsion system permits, for ships of about 25,000 to 30,000 tons displacement with a cargo carrying capacity of 5,000 tons, transoceanic transit speeds of up to 40 to 50 knots in high or adverse sea states.” FastShip sued the government, alleging patent infringement under 28 U.S.C. 1498. FastShip alleged that the Navy’s Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships, LCS-1 and LCS-3, infringed various claims. Following the Court of Federal Claims’ opinion construing various terms, the government successfully moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the LCS3 was not “manufactured” by or for the government within the meaning of section 1498 before the patents expired. The court held that LCS-1 infringed the claims and awarded FastShip $6,449,585.82 in damages plus interest. The Federal Circuit affirmed, modifying the damages award. The court interpreted “manufactured” in section 1498 in accordance with its plain meaning, such that a product is “manufactured” when it is made to include each limitation of the thing invented and is therefore suitable for use; although other portions of LCS-3 had been completed, the “waterjet” and “hull” limitations had not been completed before the patent’s expiration. View "FastShip, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law