Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute between Ulrich Speck and Bruno Scheller (collectively, “Speck”) and Brian L. Bates, Anthony O. Ragheb, Joseph M. Stewart IV, William J. Bourdeau, Brian D. Choules, James D. Purdy, and Neal E. Fearnot (collectively, “Bates”) over the priority of a patent related to a drug-coated balloon catheter. The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Patent Trial and Appeals Board (“Board”) had previously awarded priority to Bates. Speck had argued that the claims of Bates' patent application were time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(1) and invalid for lack of written description. The Board denied these motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the Board erred in finding that Bates' patent application was not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(1). The court applied a two-way test to determine if pre-critical date claims and post-critical date claims were materially different. The court found that the post-critical date claims were materially different from the pre-critical date claims, making the patent application time-barred. The court reversed the Board's decision, vacated its order canceling the claims of Speck's patent and entering judgment on priority against Speck, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "SPECK v. BATES " on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal by Pfizer Inc. from decisions made by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the Board). The Board concluded that claims 1–45 of U.S. Patent 9,492,559, owned by Pfizer and related to immunogenic compositions comprising conjugated Streptococcus pneumoniae capsular saccharide antigens for use in pneumococcal vaccines, were unpatentable. The Board also denied Pfizer’s proposed amendments to the claims.Pfizer's first challenge pertained to the Board’s conclusion regarding the molecular weight of the glycoconjugate in the patent, arguing that the Board incorrectly applied the "result-effective variable doctrine." The court disagreed, upholding the Board's decision that the molecular weight was a result-effective variable that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to optimize.Pfizer's second challenge related to the Board’s finding that the compositions of additional claims incorporating more specific glycoconjugates would have been obvious. The court disagreed with Pfizer's argument that without examples showing the claimed glycoconjugates would have each been immunogenic, there would have been no reasonable expectation of success.Thirdly, Pfizer challenged the Board’s denial of its motions to amend the claims. The court affirmed the Board's decision on some of the proposed claims but vacated the decision on others, remanding them for further consideration due to the Board’s lack of clarity.Lastly, Pfizer challenged the Patent and Trademark Office’s Director Review procedure, alleging it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court rejected this argument, finding any potential APA violation was harmless as Pfizer had not demonstrated prejudice.Therefore, the court affirmed the Board’s decisions in part, vacated them in part, and remanded the case back to the Board for further proceedings. View "PFIZER INC. v. SANOFI PASTEUR INC. " on Justia Law

In this case, the University of South Florida Board of Trustees (USF) sued the United States, claiming that the latter infringed a patent owned by USF regarding genetically modified mice for Alzheimer's Disease research. The USF contended that The Jackson Laboratory, with the government's authorization and consent, had been producing and using mice covered by the patent for the government. The government countered the claim by asserting it had a license to practice the patent under a provision of the Bayh-Dole Act, which addresses patent rights in work funded by the federal government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the provision does apply and therefore affirmed the judgment of noninfringement. The court confirmed that the April 1997 work, the first actual reduction to practice of the invention, was "in the performance of work under a funding agreement." The court also rejected USF's contention that a funding agreement must be in place at the time of the relevant work, clarifying that the Act can cover work already performed before a funding agreement is executed or becomes effective. View "University of South Florida Board of Trustees v. United States" on Justia Law

The appellants, Google LLC and ecobee, Inc. had appealed from a decision of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The Board had found that the challenged claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,498,753, owned by EcoFactor, Inc., were not unpatentable. Google argued that the Board had made an erroneous claim construction of a limitation in Claim 1 and that Google had not been given notice or an opportunity to address the Board’s construction, thereby violating the Administrative Procedure Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the Board had indeed construed Claim 1 and that its construction was erroneous. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct construction of the [1m] limitation in Claim 1. View "GOOGLE LLC v. ECOFACTOR, INC. " on Justia Law

The case involves ParkerVision, Inc. appealing a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) that invalidated one of its patents, U.S. Patent No. 7,110,444 ('444 patent), owned by ParkerVision, Inc., which relates to wireless local area networks (WLANs) that use frequency translation technology. The Board determined that claim 3 of the patent is unpatentable as obvious in light of prior art. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. The court found that the Board correctly construed the term “storage element” and did not procedurally err in how it treated certain arguments raised by the parties. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the Board's finding that the patent claim was obvious in light of prior art. The court found no violation of ParkerVision's procedural rights under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and no abuse of the Board's discretion in excluding parts of ParkerVision’s sur-reply. View "PARKERVISION, INC. v. VIDAL " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Apple and four other companies, have repeatedly been sued for patent infringement and thereafter petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to institute inter partes reviews (IPRs), under 35 U.S.C. 311–319, with unpatentability challenges to patent claims that were asserted against them in court. They sued the PTO under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701– 706, challenging instructions issued to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board concerning how to exercise, under delegation by the Director, the Director’s discretion whether to institute a requested IPR. Plaintiffs assert that the instructions are likely to produce too many denials.The district court dismissed the APA action, finding that the Director’s instructions were made unreviewable by 35 U.S.C. 314(d): “The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under [section 314] shall be final and nonappealable.” The Federal Circuit affirmed the unreviewability dismissal of plaintiffs’ challenges to the instructions as being contrary to the statute and arbitrary and capricious. No constitutional challenges are presented. The court reversed the unreviewability dismissal of the challenge to the instructions as having been improperly issued because they had to be, but were not, promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553. Apple had standing to present that challenge. View "Apple Inc. v. Vidal" on Justia Law

Centripetal filed an infringement complaint against PAN, which then filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition for one patent and a post-grant review (PGR) petition for another. While the petitions were pending, the Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) updated its interim guidance, noting that the agency “does not accept requests for Director review of decisions on institution.” The Patent Trial and Appeal Board denied institution. PAN filed Requests for Director Rehearing. The agency responded that USPTO "does not accept requests for Director review of decisions on institution ... parties may only request Director review of final written decisions" issued in IPR and PGR and that PAN’s “rehearing requests will not revert to the Board panel and there will be no further review of the Board’s decision.”PAN sought mandamus relief. A newly-appointed Director updated the interim guidance to state that “the Office does not accept requests for Director review of institution decisions” but that “the Director has always retained and continues to retain the authority to review such decisions sua sponte.” The Director has since exercised that authority. PAN argues that the Director’s current policy was contrary to the Appointments Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in “Arthrex,” (2021). The Federal Circuit denied the petition. That the Appointments Clause requires that a Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed officer have review authority does not mean that a principal officer, once bestowed with such authority, cannot delegate it to other agency officers. View "In Re Palo Alto Networks, Inc." on Justia Law

Arthrex sued S&N, alleging infringement. S&N sought inter partes review (IPR). The Patent Trial and Appeal Board found that prior art anticipated several claims. Arthrex challenged the decision on the merits and argued that the Board lacked constitutional authority to issue the final decision because its Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) were not nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, as the Appointments Clause requires for principal officers.The Federal Circuit severed the statutory limitations on the removal of APJs and remanded for rehearing by a new panel. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, finding that the appropriate remedy was to exempt the Director from 35 U.S.C. 6(c), which precludes anyone but the Board from granting rehearing of a Board decision, and remand to the Acting Director for a decision on whether to rehear the case. The offices of the Director and Deputy Director were vacant. Agency Organization Order 45-1 states, “If both the [Director] and the Deputy [Director] positions are vacant, the Commissioner for Patents . . . will perform the non-exclusive functions and duties of the [Director].” The Commissioner denied rehearing and ordered that the Board’s decision “is the final decision of the agency.”The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the Commissioner violated the Appointments Clause, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 3345, or the Constitution’s separation of powers in denying Arthrex’s rehearing request. The court agreed that prior art anticipated the challenged claims. View "Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc." on Justia Law

Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) conduct adversarial proceedings for challenging the validity of an existing patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 35 U.S.C. 6(a), (c). The Secretary of Commerce appoints PTAB members, including APJs, except the Director, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. APJs concluded that Arthrex’s patent was invalid. The Federal Circuit concluded that the APJs were principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; their appointment was unconstitutional. To remedy this violation, the court invalidated the APJs’ tenure protections, making them removable at will by the Secretary.The Supreme Court vacated. The unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during patent review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Inferior officers must be “directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” While the Director has administrative oversight, neither he nor any other superior executive officer can directly review APJ decisions. A decision by the APJs under his charge compels the Director to “issue and publish a certificate” canceling or confirming patent claims he previously allowed. Given the insulation of PTAB decisions from executive review, APJs exercise power that conflicts with the Appointments Clause’s purpose “to preserve political accountability.”Four justices concluded that section 6(c) cannot constitutionally be enforced to prevent the Director from reviewing final APJ decisions. The Director may review final PTAB decisions and may issue decisions on behalf of the Board. Section 6(c) otherwise remains operative. Because the source of the constitutional violation is the restraint on the Director’s review authority not the appointment of APJs, Arthrex is not entitled to a hearing before a new panel. View "United States v. Arthrex, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of OMB in an action brought by plaintiff and AAET, contending that patent applicants should not have to comply with certain U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) rules because the USPTO is violating the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). Plaintiff and AAET argue that patent applicants need not follow the rules because the USPTO is violating the PRA by failing to obtain OMB approval and a control number each time the USPTO makes a request to an applicant during the back-and-forth communications process concerning a particular patent. The OMB rejected this argument and concluded that the rules are not subject to the PRA.The panel held that the challenged rules do not impose "collections of information" subject to the PRA's procedural requirements. Rather, the PRA and the regulations expressly exclude from coverage individualized communications just like those between a patent examiner and a patent applicant. Furthermore, even if they impose "collections," most of the rules are exempted from the PRA under Exemption 6. View "Hyatt v. Office of Management and Budget" on Justia Law