Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

Hauge and his former employer, ERI, disputed ownership of intellectual property rights related to “pressure exchangers,” a type of energy recovery device used in reverse osmosis. In 2001 they entered into an Agreement. The district court adopted the Agreement, holding that ERI was to be the sole owner of three U.S. patents and one pending patent application. After expiration of the Agreement’s non-compete clause, in 2004, Hauge filed a patent application, titled “Pressure Exchanger,” and a utility application. The patent issued in 2007, describing “[a] pressure exchanger for transferring pressure energy from a high-pressure fluid stream to low-pressure fluid stream.” In 2009, Hauge’s new company, Isobarix, unsuccessfully attempted to reach a new agreement with ERI. Isobarix began selling a pressure exchanger, called “XPR.” Hauge entered into a consulting agreement with two ERI employees. ERI sought an Order to Show Cause, in 2012, submitting an expert’s declaration that Isobarix was using pressure exchanger technology from pre-March 19, 2001 in design and manufacture of XPR, which is “virtually identical to the ERI pressure exchanger” in operation. The court entered a Contempt Order, finding that allowing Hauge to develop new products using technology he assigned to ERI solely because the new inventions post-date the Agreement would render the Agreement useless. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that Hauge did not violate the “four corners” of the 2001 Order.View "Energy Recovery, Inc. v. Hauge" on Justia Law

In October 2004, Cellport Systems, Inc. and Peiker Acustic GMBH & Co. KG entered into an agreement concerning Cellport’s technology for the hands-free use of cellphones in cars. In 2009, Cellport filed suit against Peiker, alleging breach of that agreement and sought royalties for seven Peiker products. The district court awarded Cellport royalties on only two of the products, interpreting an acknowledgment in the license agreement as "a rebuttable presumption." Cellport appealed, and Peiker filed a conditional cross-appeal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court found that section 1.17(i) of the License Agreement created a category of products on which royalties are due regardless of whether any of Cellport’s patents were infringed; Peiker owed Cellport royalties on those products. On remand, the district court was directed to calculate the damages due Cellport for those two products. Because the district court only briefly addressed the relationship between the "BTPSC" and the "'456 Patent" the Tenth Circuit remanded to allow the district court to determine whether additional royalties were owed to Cellport. With respect to Peiker's cross-appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Cellport that the issue was not ready for appellate review and further held that it was not ripe for review by the district court. View "Cellport Systems v. Peiker Acustic" on Justia Law

In 1987, Krauser, a periodontist, designed a dental implant system. He paid BHI’s predecessor to produce drawings and prototypes. In1991, the parties entered into a written agreement that specified that Krauser would develop new products for the company to produce and sell and that the drawings were “property of [BHI].” Krauser was entitled to royalties. Krauser obtained a patent covering one component of the system and listing Krauser as the inventor. The company subsequently secured patents covering dental implant systems, naming Shaw as the sole inventor. Krauser sued the company and Shaw for a declaration of ownership rights and for copyright and patent infringement. While the suits were pending, the company filed for bankruptcy, and Krauser filed claims in bankruptcy court. In a settlement agreement, Krauser granted the company a 10-year patent license and “all rights . . . [to] the dental implant system currently being manufactured.” The bankruptcy court approved the agreement. Later, several patents on dental implant systems issued to BHI. None listed Krauser as an inventor. Krauser alleged that BHI failed to pay the full amount of royalties or submit to required audits and claimed default. The district court granted BHI summary judgment, construing the settlement to apply only to implants being manufactured in 1996, not implants manufactured at the time of litigation, and finding that Krauser had no ownership rights. The Eleventh Circuit transferred the case “[b]ecause the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction … relating to patents.” The Federal Circuit transferred the case back, noting that Krauser had dropped his claim of inventorship. View "Krauser v. Biohorizons, Inc." on Justia Law

Monsanto developed a genetic modification in soybean seeds (Roundup Ready® (RR)), known as the 40-3-2 event (RR trait), which enables soybean plants to tolerate application of glyphosate herbicide to kill weeds. Monsanto owns the patent for the RR trait and granted Pioneer a license to produce and sell seeds containing the traits. After Pioneer became a subsidiary of DuPont, Monsanto and Pioneer entered into an amended license, under which DuPont produced and sold RR trait seed. In 2006, DuPont announced that it had developed a glyphosate-tolerant trait, OGAT, expected to confer tolerance to both glyphosate and acetolactate synthase inhibitor herbicide. Testing indicated that OGAT alone did not provide sufficient glyphosate-tolerance for commercial use. DuPont then combined OGAT with the RR trait; the OGAT/RR stack provided increased yields in field trials. DuPont did not sell any OGAT/RR product, however, and discontinued development. Monsanto sued DuPont for breach of the license and patent infringement. The district court granted partial judgment to Monsanto, holding that the license was unambiguous and did not grant the right to stack non-RR technologies with the licensed” trait, but allowed DuPont to amend its answer to assert reformation counterclaims and defenses. The court ultimately told DuPont to “either voluntarily dismiss these reformation claims or produce … all documents … previously withheld.” DuPont continued litigating its reformation counterclaims and produced previously withheld internal e-mails that showed its awareness that it did not have the right to commercialize the OGAT/RR stack. The court found that DuPont’s position was not rooted in fact, that DuPont made misrepresentations and had perpetrated a fraud on the court, struck DuPont’s reformation defense and counterclaims, and awarded limited attorney fees to Monsanto. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

The Board of Trustees of Stanford University filed suit against Roche Molecular Systems ("Roche") claiming that their HIV test kits infringed upon Stanford's patents. The suit stemmed from Stanford's employment of a research fellow who was arranged by his supervisor to work at Cetus, a research company developing methods to quantify blood-borne levels of HIV. The research fellow subsequently devised a PCR-based procedure for measuring the amount of HIV in a patient's blood while working with Cetus employees. The research fellow had entered into an agreement to assign to Stanford his "right, title and interest in" inventions resulting from his employment there and subsequently signed a similar agreement at Cetus. Stanford secured three patents to the measurement process. Roche acquired Cetus's PCR-related assets and commercialized the procedure into HIV test kits. At issue was whether the University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. 200 et seq., commonly referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act ("Act"), displaced the basic principle that rights in an invention belonged to the inventor and automatically vested title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors. The Court held that the Act did not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions and therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that the research fellow's agreement with Cetus assigned his rights to Cetus, and subsequently to Roche; that the Act did not automatically void an inventor's rights in federally funded inventions; and thus, the Act did not extinguish Roche's ownership interest in the invention and Stanford was deprived of standing. View "Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Access sells software for mobile communication, owns the patents at issue, and entered into an exclusive license agreement with APAC, a subsidiary of Acacia. The agreement gave APAC the exclusive right to grant sublicenses, to sue for damages and to seek relief for infringement of the patents. The agreement disclaims third-party-beneficiary rights, states that APAC may not enforce the patents against, or seek licenses to practice the patents from, Access’s customers and end-users in connection with Access’s products and services, and states that APAC and Access consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of any California state or federal court. APAC assigned all of its rights and liabilities in the patents to a wholly owned subsidiary, SmartPhone. SmartPhone sued Huawei, which makes mobile handsets and tablets, in Texas, alleging that Huawei products infringe the patents. Huawei then sued SmartPhone, Acacia Research, and Access in California, alleging that Huawei has been an Access customer for more than 10 years and seeking declaratory judgments of noninfringement. Based on the Texas filing, the district court dismissed the noninfringement and invalidity counts under the first-to-file rule. Dismissing remaining counts, the court stated that.an allegation that the parties intended Huawei to benefit from the license agreement conflicted with its terms. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Futurewei Tech., Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp." on Justia Law

In 1997 Wawrzynski was awarded the 990 patent, entitled “Method of Food Article Dipping and Wiping in a Condiment Container.” The description illustrates a condiment container that has a flexible cap with a slitted opening. A user introduces a food article, such as a French fry, into the container through the slit and dips it into the condiment. As the food article is removed, the flexible cap wipes away excess condiment , reducing the likelihood of a drip or spill. . Wawrzynski presented his “Little Dipper” concept, permitting a consumer to either dip or squeeze, to Heinz in a 2008. Heinz indicated that the company was not interested in the product, but months later, released its new “Dip & Squeeze®” packet. Wawrzynski filed a lawsuit asserting breach of an implied contract and unjust enrichment. Heinz counterclaimed that Heinz did not infringe the patent and that the patent was invalid. The district court entered summary judgment, holding that federal patent law preempted the state law claims and that Wawrzynski failed to prove infringement. The Federal Circuit transferred to the Third Circuit, stating that its subject matter jurisdiction over patent disputes derives solely from the complaint, not from any counterclaim. View "Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

Jang, a doctor and inventor, sued BSC, the company to which Jang assigned his coronary stent patents, for breach of the patent assignment agreement, which required BSC to share profits from the patents with Jang, including any damages it recovers from third-party infringers. In 2010, BSC settled a claim against Cordis for infringement in combination with anther claim that Cordis had against BSC. BSC made a payment to Cordis, and the parties exchanged several patent licenses. BSC then denied that it had recovered any damages that it was obligated to share with Jang. The Third Circuit reversed judgment on the pleadings in favor of BSC. Two of Jang’s claims are sufficient to survive judgment on the pleadings: that BSC breached the contract because the cash offset qualifies as a “recovery of damages” and that BSC violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by structuring a settlement to thwart the agreed purpose of the patent assignment. View "Jang v. Boston Scientific SciMed Inc." on Justia Law

Taurus sued DaimlerChrysler, alleging that external websites infringed its patent for “a computer system for managing product knowledge related to products offered for sale by a selling entity.” Daimler Chrysler asserted license and release defenses, asserted a breach of contract counterclaim, and filed a contract claim against third-party defendants (including Orion), which, it claimed violated a 2006 patent licensing agreement between DaimlerChrysler and Orion, to settle prior patent infringement suits. The district court entered summary judgment, finding that the accused websites did not infringe any asserted claims and that certain claims were invalid as anticipated by prior art. The district court found the DaimlerChrysler suit to be exceptional under 35 U.S.C. 285, and awarded damages of $1,644,906.12, for costs incurred in Chrysler’s defense. With respect to remaining issues, the district court: found that certain third parties were alter egos and declined to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; held that the 2006 agreement did not provide a release to the infringement alleged in the patent suit; held that issues of fact remained as to whether certain third parties had breached a warranty in the 2006 agreement; held that Orion had breached the warranty; and imposed sanctions on Orion and another for pre-trial witness tampering (those parties were not permitted to present evidence to support their defense that Chrysler did not rely on the warranty). The Federal Circuit affirmed, except with respect to attorney fees. View "Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp." on Justia Law

This case involved disputes over licensing agreements for, inter alia, the RS 3400 blood irradiation device. At issue was whether the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a breach of contract claim that would require the resolution of a claim of patent infringement for the complainant to succeed. The court concluded that it did not have appellate jurisdiction and resolved dispositive issues in favor of Rad Source, leaving a single dispositive issue for certification: When a licensee enters into a contract to transfer all of its interests in a license agreement for an entire term of a license agreement, save one day, but remains liable to the licensor under the license agreement, is the contract an assignment of the license agreement, or is the contract a sublicense? View "MDS (Canada) Inc., et al. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law