Justia Patents Opinion Summaries

This appeal stems from a patent dispute involving Amity's patent for a device that dispenses both toothpicks and tablets and Market Quest's alleged infringement of the patent. The court concluded that this case arises under the patent laws and therefore falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the appeal, but concluded that, had this appeal been filed with the Federal Circuit at the time it was filed with this court, the Federal Circuit would have had jurisdiction. And because this appeal is neither frivolous nor is there any indication that it was filed in bad faith, the court concluded that transfer is in the interest of justice. Therefore, the court ordered the matter transferred to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1631. View "Amity Rubberized Pen Co. v. Market Quest Grp." on Justia Law

Versata successfully sued SAP for infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed a damages award, but vacated an injunction, and remanded. Meanwhile, SAP petitioned the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to institute covered business method (CBM) review --an administrative review procedure established in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), 125 Stat. 284 (2011), asserting that key claims were unpatentable and invalid. While the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) was conducting CBM review, Versata sued to set aside the decision to institute review. The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction: “AIA’s express language, detailed structure and scheme for administrative and judicial review, legislative purpose, and nature of administrative action evince Congress’s clear intent to preclude subject matter jurisdiction over the PTAB’s decision to institute patent reexamination.” The court state that “the decision to institute post-grant review is merely an initial step in the PTAB’s process to resolve the ultimate question of patent validity, not a final agency action. . . . Plaintiff retains an alternative adequate remedy through appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; Versata’s attempt to obtain judicial review was addressed to the decision to institute stage, so the court was correct in barring judicial review, 35 U.S.C. 324(e). View "Versata Dev. Grp. v. Lee" on Justia Law

Celgard is a developer and manufacturer of battery membranes, used to separate chemical cell components in lithium-ion batteries, preventing contact between the positive and negative electrodes. The patents concerns a separator technology that uses a ceramic composite coating that helps prevent electrical shorting. This technology is used in rechargeable batteries in electronic vehicles and consumer electronic devices such as laptops and cellular phones. Celgard is headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. SKI is a manufacturer of separators for use in lithium-ion batteries. SKI mainly supplies the separators to third-party manufacturers, but also manufactures batteries that include the separators it produces. SKI’s principal place of business is in Seoul, Korea. All of SKI’s design, manufacturing, and sales operations are based in Korea. Celgard sued SKI for infringement. Celgard sought to establish the district court’s jurisdiction based on allegations that SKI purposefully directed activities at the forum state through sales and offers for sale of its accused separators to residents of North Carolina. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, under either a purposeful-direction theory or a stream-of-commerce theory, noting an absence of evidence that SKI ever sold or offered for sale the accused products in North Carolina. View "Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

SpeedTrack’s patent, entitled “Method for Accessing Computer Files and Data, Using Linked Categories Assigned to Each Data File Record on Entry of the Data File Record,” describes methods for searching and accessing files stored on a computer system. The claimed methods require use of: “category descriptions,” corresponding to stored files; a “file information directory” containing information linking “category descriptions” to specific system files; and a “search filter,” to locate files that have “category descriptions” matching those in the filter. SpeedTrack sued, alleging that Walmart’s online retail website infringed the patent by permitting visitors to search for available products by selecting pre-defined descriptive categories. Walmart licensed and used Endeca’s software to achieve this functionality. After reexamination by the PTO, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement , finding that, because the accused Endeca software uses numerical identifiers instead of descriptive words, users did not use “category descriptions” required by the patent. The Federal Circuit affirmed the claim construction. Speedtrack later sued Office Depot. The Federal Circuit affirmed judgment as a matter of law, finding that SpeedTrack’s claims were barred by res judicata and under the “Kessler doctrine,” which bars suits against customers for use of a product previously found not to infringe in a suit against the product’s supplier. View "SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

Gaymar ‘s patent is directed to a patient temperature control system, including a blanket that can conductively warm or cool the patient. In 2008, Gaymar sued CSZ, asserting that CSZ’s Blanketrol device infringed claims of the patent. The PTO granted CSZ’s inter partes reexamination request and issued a first Office Action rejecting all claims of the patent as anticipated or obvious over prior art cited in CSZ’s request. The district court denied Gaymar’s motion for a preliminary injunction and granted CSZ’s motion to stay the case pending the conclusion of the reexamination. The PTO reaffirmed its rejection of all claims of the patent. Gaymar filed an express abandonment of all claims in 2010, and the PTO concluded the reexamination, cancelling all of the claims. The district court lifted the stay. CSZ unsuccessfully sought attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 285, alleging that Gaymar’s litigation position was frivolous and that Gaymar had engaged in litigation misconduct. Following the Supreme Court’s 2014, decision, Octane Fitness, CSZ unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. The Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of a lack of objective baselessness, but reversed the exceptional case finding insofar as it was based on CSZ’s purported misconduct. View "Gaymar Indus., Inc. v. Cincinnati Sub-Zero Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Fluorescent lamp fixtures typically regulate electric current by an electronic ballast, which maintains current levels high enough to start the lamp but prevents current from reaching destructive levels. When a lamp is removed from its holders or when a filament is broken, current provided by the ballast ceases to flow and dissipates back into the ballast, which can destroy the ballast and create an electric shock hazard. LB’s 529 patent discloses an electronic ballast able to shield itself from destructive levels of current. LB sued ULT, asserting infringement. ULT argued that the term “voltage source means” is governed by 35 U.S.C. 112 and that the claims are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 12 as indefinite because the specification fails to disclose what structure corresponded to the “voltage source means” limitation. The district court concluded that the term “voltage source means” had sufficient structure. A jury awarded LB $3 million in damages. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that claim construction is an issue of law that it reviews de novo. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of its holding in Teva Pharmaceuticals (2015), that while the ultimate question of claim construction is a legal question, there may be underlying “subsidiary” factual findings related to the extrinsic record that are reviewed for clear error. On remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed. Because the district court’s factual findings demonstrate that the claims convey sufficient structure, it was correct to conclude that the term “voltage source means” is not governed by section 112. View "Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics, NA" on Justia Law

INTTRA owns patents relating to online methods for coordinating containerized shipping. GT sought a declaratory judgment that INTTRA’s shipping methods patents were invalid. While the case was pending, GT petitioned the PTO to review the patents as covered-business-method patents. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board instituted review, but granted INTTRA leave to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that section 325(a)(1) barred the reviews because of the civil action. GT argued that INTTRA had waived that objection by not presenting it within the 14 days allowed by the rule giving a right to seek reconsideration. The Board granted INTTRA’s motion and “terminated” proceedings, without addressing patentability, reasoning that section 325(a)(1) is a statutory limit on Board “jurisdiction.” The Federal Circuit dismissed and denied mandamus relief. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. 325 declares that “review may not be instituted . . . if, before the date on which the petition for such a review is filed, the petitioner … filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the patent.” GT identified nothing that precludes the Board from reconsidering an initial institution decision or invoking the 325(a)(1) bar on its own, or inviting the patentee to file a motion after more than 14 days. View "GTNX, Inc.. v. INTTRA, Inc." on Justia Law

The 109 patent, entitled “Gelatinous Elastomer Compositions and Articles,” is directed to composite articles of a thermoplastic gel and a substrate, such as foam or fabric, used as a protective liner between an amputated limb and a prosthetic limb. According to the patent, prosthetic liners that incorporate the claimed composite articles are comfortable and skin-friendly, and more durable than previous liners. Alps licensed several AEI patents, including the 109 patent. Shortly thereafter, Alps, without naming AEI as a co-plaintiff, filed a patent infringement suit against OWW. Alps declined to join as co-plaintiff. OWW moved to dismiss for lack of standing. Alps and AEI executed an amended license agreement 16 months after Alps commenced the action, listing the effective date of the original agreement. The court denied the motion, finding that the terms of the original agreement was sufficed to provide Alps with standing and that, under the nunc pro tunc amended agreement, Alps “clearly possesses the substantial rights to proceed without [AEI].” A jury found the patent valid and infringed. The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of OWW’s motion to dismiss and vacated the judgment. Alps possessed neither legal title nor all substantial rights at the outset of the litigation, and was required to join AEI, as a co-plaintiff. View "Alps South, LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co." on Justia Law

Beginning in 1983, interferences were declared between Fiers and Sugano generally relating to claims to DNA sequences that encode the precursor and/or mature forms of human fibroblast interferon proteins, which promote viral resistance in human tissue, and in the case of the most recent interference, to claims for the proteins themselves. All of Fiers’ applications claimed priority to a United Kingdom Patent Application filed in April 1980, while Sugano’s applications and patents claimed priority to a Japanese Patent Application, filed in March 1980. In the first and second interferences, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences awarded priority to Sugano. In 2013, in response to a third interference the Board declared that Fiers was estopped from proceeding, given that Fiers lost the prior interferences and the subject matter was the same as in the prior interferences. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 Stat. 284, eliminated district court jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. 146 with respect to interferences commenced after September 15, 2012. The district court transferred the case to the Federal Circuit, which concluded that the district court correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction and that the Board’s decision was not erroneous. View "Biogen Ma, Inc. v. Japanese Found. for Cancer Research" on Justia Law

Oplus filed a patent infringement suit in Illinois that was transferred to California. Oplus moved the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer the case back and consolidate it with other cases. The Panel denied the motion. Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement. Defendant sought attorneys’ and expert witness fees under 35 U.S.C. 285 and 28 U.S.C. 1927. The court made numerous findings regarding misconduct, found the case exceptional under section 285, and held that Oplus and its counsel were vexatious litigants. The court nonetheless denied the request, stating that “[a]though Oplus’s behavior has been inappropriate, unprofessional, and vexatious, an award of attorney fees must take the particular misconduct into account,” the “case has been fraught with delays and avoidance tactics to some degree on both sides,” and “[t]here is little reason to believe that significantly more attorney fees or expert fees have been incurred than would have been in the absence of Oplus’s vexatious behavior.” Concerning section 1927, the court stated that “there is no evidence suggesting that Oplus’s behavior stemmed from bad faith or a sufficient intent to harass,” although there was “ample evidence of Oplus’s litigation misconduct.” The Federal Circuit vacated, finding the denial an abuse of discretion. View "Oplus Techs., Ltd. v. Vizio, Inc." on Justia Law